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This chapter will identify and examine some of the major legal issues raised by
the development and proliferation of technologies involved in assisted reproduction. It will review the application of existing legal principles, statutes and
common law rules to these issues, and will illustrate the uncertainty present in
the current legal regime in Canada. The chapter will then evaluate the need for a
unified regulatory framework for reproductive technologies ("RTs").' While the
focus of the chapter is an identification and review of the legal issues, it should
be understood that these are shaped in a moral, ethical and social context.
As noted by the Law Reform Commission of Canada ("LRC"), "[m]edically
assisted procreation is perhaps one of the best examples of the challenges posed
by the development of medical science and the tensions to which they give rise
for the law."' Distinct from many other forms of medical intervention or practice, the use of reproductive technologies by some citizens can fundamentally

Reproductive technologies [hereafter "RTs"] are often defined as "the full range of biomedical/technical interferences during the process of procreation whether aimed at producing a child
or preventing/terminating pregnancy" (R.D. Klein, "What's 'new' about the 'new' reproductive
technologies?" in G. Corea et al., Man-made Women: How New Reproductive Technologies
Affect Women (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1987) at 64). This definition includes abortion, contraception, sterilization, pre-conception and pre-natal testing and birth practices and
techniques. For purposes of this chapter, RTs will have a narrower meaning and will only include those techniques and procedures that are used to produce a child. Moreover, while much
of the literature and many of the commissions which have studied these techniques and practices refer to them as "new" RTs, this chapter will refer to RTs or forms of assisted conception,
as a way of acknowledging that one of the practices, assisted insemination, is indeed an old
practice.
Law Reform Commission of Canada, Medically Assisted Procreation (Working Paper 65)
(Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1992) at 1.
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affect the lives of all Canadians and their children.' Actions taken behind the
traditionally closed door of the doctor-patient relationship involve broader consequences for all members of society! Because the application of reproductive
technologies is often carried out within the context of the doctor-patient relationship, many conventional health law issues will arise. Among these are questions of informed consent, standards of care, confidentiality and the legal regulation of the practioners performing various techniques of medically assisted
conception. In these cases, traditional sources of health law— including many
of the common law standards and principles and statutory provisions discussed
in this book
should provide adequate means for regulating practice and resolving disputes in this area. However, because reproductive technologies hold
the potential to transform social relationships, their introduction into medical
practice involves issues beyond the physician-patient relationship and the existing regulation of medical practice.
RTs enable the deliberate manipulation of the processes and materials of human reproduction outside of sexual intercourse. Usually, the intention and effect
is to produce a child. However, current innovations in reproductive biology and
medicine also produce or isolate other reproductive materials or entities: vials of
semen, unfertilized ova, zygotes, embryos'
which have not existed in this
way before. How are we to regard and treat these novel entities? Who has control over them? For what can they be used? The use of RTs, moreover, makes
possible the creation of novel social arrangements: post-mortem insemination ,6
-

The Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies [hereinafter "Royal Commission"]
reported that in 1991 between approximately one and two per cent of all births in Canada were
the result of either artificial insemination or in vitro fertilization; Royal Commission, Proceed
With Care: Final Report of the Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies (Ottawa:
Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1992) at 435.
This point is made by M. Hudson in "Societal Controls on New Reproductive Technologies: A
Canadian Perspective" in L. Weir, ed., Governing Medically Assisted Human Reproduction:
Report of an International Symposium (Toronto: Centre of Criminology, University of Toronto,
1997) 73 at 73.
As noted by the Royal Commission, there is a problem with the terminology in this area.
Technically, the term "zygote" refers to the fertilized egg prior to implantation. "Embryo" refers to the developing entity after implantation into a woman's uterus until about eight weeks
after fertilization, when it becomes known as a fetus. However, since the term embryo is often
used in public discourse in place of zygote, we continue to use it in reference to the fertilized
egg prior to implantation. For further discussion of this issue see: Royal Commission, supra,
note 3 at 607. See also Bill C- 47 Human Reproductive and Genetic Technologies Act, 2nd
Sess., 35th Parl., 1996 s. 2. Bill C-47 draws a distinction between zygotes (or pie-embryos) and
embryos, where the former means a human organism in its first 15 days of development, and
the latter refers to one beginning from the 16th day to the 56th day. This distinction seems
rather arbitrary and based on such factors as the state of medical knowledge and the embryos'
development of specific human-like features, such as the early indicators of a nervous system.
The fetus is defined by its development beginning from the 57th day to birth.
See Parpalaix v. CECOS T.G.I. Creteil, August 1, 1984, Gazette du Palais, September 15, 1984
(France). See infra, note 193. (dispositional control over the deceased's sperm deposit); Hecht
v. Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Los Angeles (Kane), 20 Cal.Rptr.
2d 275 (1993) (deceased's sperm as part of his estate distributed in light of his intentions to

I
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virgin births, post-menopausal pregnancy,' multiple "parents," anonymous genetic parents, and embryos conceived at one time being born at different times,
or to different people. How are we to understand these new social arrangements
and how should they be regulated? These and other questions focus on the ways
in which RTs are defined and conceptualized in theory, as well as accessed and
controlled in practice. The use of RTs holds implications for kinship and thereby
alters our understanding of the legal, social, and emotional bonds created by
heredity and the consequences presumed to ensue from processes of intercourse,
conception and birth.
Typically, health law investigates the principles, statutes, and constitututional
and policy framework, which shape the allocation and delivery of health care
services and the relationship between the health care provider and patient. The
World Health Organization ("WHO") defines health as a state of physical and
a definition broader than that of medicine. Health is more
mental well-being
than the absence of disease and includes the harmonious development of the
human person! Moreover, since human beings socially interact, whether in the
medical sciences or the daily routines of life, health is as much a social construction as a biological condition; its norms are constructed in a social environment and include not only medical-scientific determinants but also social
determinants. Law can be one such determinant. Since law helps to determine
and regulate the social relations which underpin individual well-being and, by
implication, individual health status, law itself becomes one of the factors which
affect individual health.
In the area of RTs, where the very novelty of the procedures and their impact
suggests the lack of social consensus about the right or proper course of action,
the focus turns to the recurring question: what should the law be? The emergence of RTs over the last quarter century has sparked numerous efforts at
regulatory reform by panels and commissions established in many jurisdictions
throughout the world. These assembled groups considered whether or not to
establish a new reproductive order, or to find ways of containing the new possibilities engendered by the RTs within the old reproductive order.'
While these forums have led to volumes of recommendations and sometimes,
regulations, they have rarely led to legislation." One possible response would be
to distinguish between regulating reproductive technologies and establishing
legal norms for their consequences. It has been argued that regulation should
-

8

procreate after death); R. v. Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, ex parte Blood,
[1997] 2 All E.R. 687 (C.A.) (use of sperm taken from comatose husband without prior written
consent as required by legislation).
See A. Lippman, "Never Too Late': Biotechnology, Women and Reproduction" (1995) 40
McGill L.J. 875.
B.M. Knoppers & S. Le Bris, "Ethical and legal concerns: reproductive technologies 19901993" (1993)5 Cur-rent Opinion in Obstetrics and Gynaecology 630 at 631.
D. Roy, J. Williams & B. Dickens, Bioethics in Canada (Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice Hall
Canada Inc., 1994) at 132.
Knoppers et al., supra, note 8 at 630.

-

-
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focus solely on the particular ends ethically unacceptable in society," rather than
widely constrain and "chill" medical science and technology. Alternatively, a
regulatory regime might account for the use of RTs as both a means by assisting
biological processes and as ends with social implications. This chapter will explore the legal ramifications of pursuing either approach to the regulation of
RTs. Currently, there is a legal vacuum regarding the express regulation of reproductive technologies in Canada. Although statutes and case law in America
and other jurisdictions provide some guidance, their application as persuasive
forces in the Canadian context remains questionable.
In Canada, the dominant tendency has been to regulate reproductive technologies as medical practice, rather than to address alternatives such as adoption
and the social acceptance of infertility. The increasing use of RTs have heightened calls for legal regulation by interested citizens and practitioners who now
seek clear guidance from statutory or judge-made law. In recent years there have
been several proposals for legal reform put forward by a number of formal
commissions, most significantly, the Royal Commission on New Reproductive
Technologies ("Royal Commission"). These efforts at the time of writing, however, have yet to result in any comprehensive legislation. The Bill near the end
of the enactment process, however, died on the order paper when Parliament
was dissolved on April 27, 1997, just prior to a federal election. Although Bill
C-47 never came into force, and thus has no legal effect, it illustrates how the
federal government has recently approached regulatory concerns for RTs. In this
chapter, we occasionally draw upon Bill C-47 to not only describe past regulatory attempts, but also to illustrate possible forms of future legislation that governments may consider in their renewed efforts at regulation.
This chapter canvasses the basic definitions of infertility taking into account
both the biological factors and social norms which colour the stipulation of infertility as a medical condition. We then describe the RTs used in the treatment
of infertility and raise a number of legal issues arising from the introduction of
RTs in medical practice. These issues include: access to RTs, informed consent
and the legal rules governing the status, control and disposition of sperm, ova
and embryos. This chapter explores the constitutional, common law and statutory implications of such issues. We consider a range of possible legal and
regulatory frameworks governing the use of RTs. The chapter ends with a detailed review of specific legal problems generated by the advent of RTs.

"[d]efining infertility as a socially generated problem implies that we should
look to social solutions .1112 Moreover, for both medical and social conditions (or
problems), the communication of what it means to be infertile involves particular language and definitions chosen by medical practitioners, legislators, and
other interested parties. Recourse to reproductive technologies as a response to
infertility, however, has traditionally been based on the diagnosis of infertility as
a medical problem or disease to be treated according to medical procedures. In
the medical model, physicians and other health care practitioners identify and
evaluate the condition of infertility, and then make choices about the appropriate
use of RTs and their regulation. Many critics and commentators question the
claims of the medical community to define or diagnose infertility as a medical
problem and then to prescribe RTs as the best possible treatment to achieve reproduction. Closer examination of the causes and incidences that identify the
condition of infertility raise questions about the appropriateness of the medical
model as a framework within which to define the treatment of infertility. We
will now consider alternative definitions and illustrate the ways in which the
condition and definition of infertility shape the legal regulation of RTs.'3
According to most medical definitions, infertility is the inability to produce a
child despite regular unprotected intercourse over a certain period of time during a woman's fertile period. According to Bernard Dickens, in an oft-quoted
passage:

306

A. INFERTILITY
Reproductive technologies are considered as a treatment for the condition of
infertility experienced by women and men. Infertility may be viewed as a medical problem with biological and physiological aspects, or as a social condition of
childlessness. However, one's view of whether childlessness should be as good
and acceptable a choice as having children can shape the distinction between
medical problem and social condition. The Royal Commission states that

B. Dickens, "Do Not Criminalize New Reproductive Technologies" (March 1996) Policy Optionsil.

Infertility includes infecundity, meaning inability to conceive or impregnate, and
pregnancy wastage, meaning failure to carry a pregnancy to term through spontaneous abortion and stillbirth. Infertility includes primary infertility, where a couple has never achieved conception, and secondary fertility, where at least one conception has occurred but the couple is currently unable to achieve pregnancy.'4

In Canada, infertility is typically defined as failure to conceive within one year
of regular unprotected sexual intercourse." The WHO, however, stipulates a
time period of two years.'6 At least some medical practitioners treat infertility

Royal Commission, supra, note 3 at 173. The common assumption is that the need and desire
to have children is a normal part of our lives.
See Royal Commission, ibid., at 172-75. See also S. Franklin, "Deconstructing 'Desperateness':
The Social Construction of Infertility in Popular Representations on New Reproductive Technologies," in M. McNeil, I. Varcoe & S. Yearley, The New Reproductive Technologies (New
York: St. Martins Press, 1990) at 200. See also T. Balakrishnan & R. Fernando, "Infertility
Among Canadians: An Analysis of Data from the Canadian Fertility Survey (1984) and General
Social Survey (1990)," in Royal Commission, The Prevalence of Infertility in Canada, vol. 6
(Ottawa: Ministry of Supply and Services, Canada, 1993). Infertility has also been categorized
as perceived or inferred infertility, where the former refers to the woman's "subjective" perception of infertility, and the latter to an "objective" inference of infertility according to basic criteria; ibid., "Aggregate infertility" is said to be a combination of perceived and inferred infertility; ibid.
B. Dickens, "Reproduction Law and Medical Consent" (1985) 35 U.T.L.J. 255 at 281.
Royal Commission, supra, note 3 at 183.
Ibid.
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negatively as a "malfunctioning" of the human system over a period of time,
and thus as a "disease."" In Canada, three formal commissions have enunciated
three different definitions of "infertility" which span the spectrum of the medical and the social. The Ontario Law Reform Commission ("OLRC") defined
infertility in terms of couples who "have attempted, but failed, to produce a
child and do not respond to conventional therapy."8 The OLRC's definition is
limited to medical criteria, and does not include "personal choices that bear no
relation to the issue of medical need."9 Similarly, the LRC defined infertility as
"the involuntary, significant reduction of reproductive capacity," as based on the
"inability to become pregnant after one year of unprotected intercourse."20 On
the other hand, the Royal Commission simply defined the "prevalence of infertility" over one (and two years): "The absence of pregnancy in a couple who
have been cohabiting for at least the past year and who have not used contraception during that period."2' The Royal Commission elaborated an account
addressing "the physiological and sociological aspects of infertility."22 The three
definitions of infertility above illustrate the conflation of social and medical
factors. The recommendations by each formal commission, and thus possible
regulatory regimes, seem to vary according to these definitions and the social
context of their production.
Infertility has also been variously identified as a social condition. The traditional view emphasizes the dominant model of the nuclear family, consisting of
heterosexual parents and their biologically-related children. Under this model,
infertility derogates from the "ideal family" as the norm of a married heterosexual couple with children. This model generates strong social pressure to satisfy
the norm for couples to procreate. The basic assumption is that the need and
desire to have children is a normal part of our lives.23 Moreover, the stigma of
childlessness can be overwhelming, especially for women who have historically

'

Ibid., at 172.
Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report on Human Artificial Reproduction and Related
Matters, vol. 1 (Toronto: Ministry of Attorney General, 1985) at 9. Conventional therapy for
males and females varies and may include infertility counselling, hormones, and surgery; ibid.,
at 14-15.
19
Ibid., at 10.
20
Law Reform Commission of Canada, supra, note 2 at 14.
21
Royal Commission, supra, note 3 at 186. The Royal Commission also used a two-year definition, substituting into the quoted version, "for at least the past two years." The Royal Commission, however, failed to address the definition and issue of contraception, nor did it account for
lesbian and single women not cohabiting with a male partner.
22
Ibid., at 173. The Royal Commission assumes that physiological dimensions can be, at times,
entirely separated from sociological dimensions.
23
It has been argued that the "need" and "desire" for children conflate social and biological explanations of infertility; S. Franklin, "Deconstructing 'Desperateness': The Social Construction
of Infertility in Popular Representations on New Reproductive Technologies," supra, note 13.
See also K. Alpem, "Genetic Puzzles and Stork Stories: On the Meaning and Significance of
Having Children," in K. Alpem, ed., The Ethics of Reproductive Technology (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1992) at 147.
18
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been defined and identified through their roles as mothers.24 The "treatment" of
women for the condition or "disease" of infertility must therefore be viewed in
this gender-specific context. In response to involuntary childlessness, RTs
promise enablement or, at least, give hope for procreation. However, RTs may
also generate new stresses and problems where "infertile" women may feel pressured to use RTs, and to continue to do so, cycle after cycle even when treatment repeatedly fails. This pressure can have significant economic, physiological and psychological costs. Conversely, women who choose to pay to reproduce (in "surrogacy" contracts) may be stigmatized as "deviant"
or criminal
under some proposed legislative models
in spite of the considerable social
pressure to produce children. The commercialization of procreation is viewed as
problematic in light of societal norms; the basic assumption is that human reproduction is usually outside the market realm.
Persons who do not have partners of the opposite sex are not generally recognized as being "infertile" when procreation outside of marriage is not socially
desirable. In addition, single women who procreate without the involvement of a
male partner, lesbian couples, or women who wish to have a child without becoming pregnant may be considered as socially infertile, and may seek access to
various forms of assisted reproduction. Some individuals and couples who carry
genetic conditions may wish to avoid natural procreation and passing these
conditions onto their child. Those persons not considered medically "infertile"
in light of definitions in formal guidelines or informal practices may therefore
use reproductive technologies.
Infertility is said to be caused by, or at least associated with, several factors
of medical (or biological), environmental and social dimensions. The more
common physiological causes have been recognized as sexually transmitted
diseases, smoking, and age.25 Where people wait longer before attempting to
reproduce, they face lower chances of success due to biological aging and the
increased exposure to risk factors over time." Infertile individuals may, also,
wait longer than those who are fertile, before seeing a physician. Other possible
causes of biological infertility include environmental toxins and workplace hazards, diet, alcohol, caffeine, illicit drugs, medical disease, medical procedures
with unintended effects, sterilization, and contraception.27 Having identified
some possible causes, one also faces the possibility of confusing them with the
effects of infertility. For example, it could also be argued that old age is not only
a cause of infertility but also an effect of one's natural progression to a state of
-

24

See N. Pfeffer, "Artificial Insemination, In Vitro Fertilization, and the Stigma of Infertility" in
M. Stanworth, ed. Reproductive Technologies: Gender, Motherhood and Medicine
(Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis, 1987) at 81.
25
Royal Commission, Proceed with Care: Final Report of the Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies (Ottawa: Ministry of Supply and Services Canada, 1992), at 172.
26
Ibid., at 190-91, 255, 261-62; Ontario Law Reform Commission, vol. 1, supra, note 18 at 1213. It is well known that the old age factor affects the fertility of females much more so than
males.
2/
Royal Commission, supra, note 25 at 199-338. See Law Reform Commission of Canada, Medically Assisted Procreation (Working Paper 65) (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services,
1992), at 15-17. See also Ontario Law Reform Commission, supra, note 18 at 10-14.
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not being capable to reproduce. Thus, RTs leading to post-menopausal pregnancy may be said to address both the causes and effects of infertility.
Infertility is often regarded as affecting couples, thus reinforcing the idea that
treatments be only available to socially recognized unions. This obscures the
fact that single individuals may be concerned about their reproductive health
status and may seek treatment even before wishing to reproduce. Moreover,
individuals may not be aware of their medical or biological infertility. Where
infertility is reported as a percentage of the adult population of childbearing age,
teens and post-menopausal women (who have now gained access to RTs in
some countries)" who are infertile will be excluded. These and numerous other
considerations illustrate how social values and policy preferences have circumscribed the biological definitions of infertility and may not be included in reported figures based on actual treatment. The medically infertile couple, for
example, has maintained dominance as a privileged form of social relationship.
The use of "couples" as a standard for recognizing infertility does not account for men's "child-bearing" age. Most reproductive technologies have focused on women as the problematic part of the couple. They can be the subjects
of treatment even when the male partner is medically (or biologically) infertile.
Sometimes, fertile women undergo invasive procedures, such as in vitro fertilization, for the treatment of their infertile husbands. This tendency occurs in the
face of empirical evidence indicating that the incidence of infertility among men
ranges from approximately half to equal that of women.29 However, men's infertility is much less researched and understood than women's." This is an example of the social and gendered aspect of infertility. Although infertility is
generally thought to be on the rise, this may, in part, stem from the large number
of women who delay having children to establish their careers. It is therefore
appropriate to consider the condition of infertility as an inextricable complex of
social and medical (or biological) dimensions.
The infertile are said to have several options: treatment by RTs; adoption; or
"live with it." A more comprehensive and comprehensible approach would account for these options in social context, particularly the prevailing perceptions

and attitudes towards "family" relations." The alternatives of adoption and the
"live with it" option have not yet alleviated public concerns. Public adoption
involves an average six-year wait due to a shortage of babies to be adopted .31
The process is long and complex, and remains difficult for single women and
men. Alternatively, the widespread acceptance of the "live with it" option would
require a notable shift in social norms in Canadian society. Such shifts in Canadian values seem difficult to recognize and therefore to account for within government policy and a regulatory regime. The lack of adoption opportunities and
the basic social unacceptability of infertility have generated an increasing demand for RTs and their regulation. The various conditions, problem-definitions,
and options for the treatment of infertility have generated much confusion
among practitioners and interested parties.
In response to the prevalence of infertility, the Royal Commission recommends that priority be given to prevention of infertility rather than focusing
solely on its treatment.33 The federal government's White Paper proposes to address the condition of infertility by stressing "infertility prevention, social solutions and, lastly, infertility interventions that are appropriate, safe, and effective."" Such proposals, if implemented, would require the re-allocation of resources among lines of prevention and treatment within the health care system.
We will now consider the challenges of RTs and their regulation as a primary
treatment for infertility, providing new opportunities for reproduction by infertile individuals and couples.
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For example, see "Baby Sparks Dispute," The Globe and Mail (12 January 1995). See also A.
Lippman, "Never Too Late': Biotechnology, Women and Reproduction" (1995) 40 McGill
L.J. 875.
A report conducted for the Royal Cominisssion found that male infertility occurred in onequarter of couples who sought treatment at a fertility clinic; supra, note 25 at 167. The Ontario
Law Reform Commission [hereafter "OLRC"] reports that "[t]here appears to be general
agreement that the causes of infertility are distributed evenly among male factors, female factors, and a combination of both male and female factors"(OLRC, supra, note 18 at 11). See also
another study reported by the OLRC indicating marked differences similar to those found by
the Royal Conmiission; ibid, at note 6. It should be noted, however, that empirical studies on
infertility, in light of the social stigmatization attached to its reporting, may be under a shroud
of mystery. The lack of data, however, seems to benefit the status quo, focusing on women's
infertility, and not men's contribution. Moreover, such studies may exclude those who deliberately choose, for genetic or other reasons, not to attempt conception.
Royal Conmiission, supra, note 25 at 167.

t• lilulsi
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Several reproductive technologies exist for treatment of infertility, namely, donor or non-donor artificial insemination, in vitro fertilization and related technologies, and embryo manipulation and research.35 Artificial insemination is the
oldest and most basic reproductive technique, and may occur by husband/partner ("AIH") or by donor ("AID").` It involves the artificial (or therapeutic) placement of sperm into the vagina, cervix, uterus, or fallopian tube at
the appropriate time. The placement coincides with ovulation so as to increase
the chances of conception. As a relatively inexpensive and non-invasive procedure, artificial insemination has been a popular first choice for the treatment of
biological and social infertility. However, another reproductive technique is

3i

The Royal Commission contends that the biological and sociological aspects of reproduction
are intertwined; ibid., at 169.
32
Ibid., at 370. See also the OLRC, supra, note 18 at 15-17.
33
Royal Commission, ibid., at 177.
"
New Reproductive Technologies: Setting Boundaries, Enhancing Health (Ottawa: Supply and
Services Canada, 1996) at 19.
35
For a more detailed discussion, see Law Reform Commission, supra, note 27 at 22-76; Royal
Commission, supra, note 25 at 425-659.
36
It is also called therapeutic insemination by husband/partner ("TIH") or by donor ("TID"). In
practice, the semen by the husband/partner may be mixed with that of the donor. The Royal
Commission concludes that this practice is not considered good practice as it generates ambiguity over parentage; ibid., at 439.
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required where infertility is due to the absence or blockage of a woman's fallopian tubes (i.e., when the egg cannot pass through the fallopian tubes to be fertilized and implanted in the uterus).
In vitro fertilization has rapidly developed since its introduction in the late
1970s, and has brought with it many new possibilities for assisted reproduction.37 In vitro fertilization basically involves the retrieval of a woman's eggs
from her ovaries and the fertilization of those eggs (in a glass petri dish, or in
vitro) outside her body and their re-implantation either into her womb or that of
another woman.38 The in vitro process usually involves the creation of many
embryos and the selection of a few for implantation; the remaining embryos
may be destroyed, frozen for later use, donated to other women or couples, or
used for research. In vitro fertilization is much more onerous than artificial insemination. The monitoring of ovulation, the inducement of superovulation, and
the retrieval of a woman's eggs are invasive with attendant medical risks and
side effects.39 In vitro fertilization is typically used when infertility is due to the
absence or blockage of a woman's fallopian tubes, or male factor infertility.
Assisted reproduction may also involve related technologies such as gamete
intra-fallopian transfer ("GIFT") and intracytoplasmic sperm injection. In treatment of male factor infertility, in vitro fertilization may be combined with the
micromanipulation techniques of sperm injection and egg manipulation (i.e.,
zona cutting or drilling for easier sperm penetration). Intracytoplasmic sperm
injection is a relatively new procedure, which involves the careful selection and
injection of a single sperm into an egg."° GIFT is a procedure which places
sperm and eggs directly into the fallopian tube.4 ' It is combined with superovulation, a preliminary process, which produces additional eggs for placement
back into the fallopian tube to increase the possibility of conception. The fertilization itself is said to occur naturally. The GIFT process, however, does not
assist women with fallopian tube blockage.
Embryos may also be genetically screened or even manipulated prior to implantation. For example, it may someday be possible: to manipulate an embryo
to produce one containing the same genetic information as a living or deceased
human being; to alter its genetic structure so that such alteration may be transmitted to a subsequent generation; or to create animal-human hybrids.42 Such
attempted manipulations might also be implanted into a woman and even

37

'
39

'°

C.L. Meyer, The Wandering Uterus: Politics and the Reproductive Rights of Women (New
York: New York University Press, 1997).
For a more detailed description, see Law Reform Commission, supra, note 27 at 22-50.
The side effects of superovulation, for example, can include: hot flushes, abdominal discomfort,
blurred vision and ovarian cysts. See: D.L. Steinberg, Bodies in Glass: Genetics, Eugenics,
Embryo Ethics (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997) at 34-35.
It is also claimed that intracytoplasmic sperm injection, when combined with epididymal sperm
aspiration
making it possible to retrieve sperm from the epididymis or the testicles
creates
new reproductive opportunities for men with low sperm counts (Toronto Centre for Advanced
Reproductive Technology, Newsletter, 1996).
See Law Reform Commission, supra, note 27 at 50-53.
See Bill C-47, An Act Respecting Human Reproductive and Genetic Technologies and Com-

41
42

-

mercial Transactions Relating to Human Reproduction, 2nd Sess., 35th Part., 1996, s. 4.
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brought to term. Moreover, in vitro fertilization and genetic screening may
someday allow for the screening and manipulation of embryos for particular
genetic traits. Current in vitro procedures already involve a selection process
where the most viable of many embryos are chosen for implantation. The remaining embryos may be frozen, stored, and manipulated for use at a later date.
As well, these remaining embryos may be used for research purposes, where
researchers manipulate, through experimentation, various environmental factors
or the genetic makeup of embryos.
So far, we have described the RTs commonly used in Canada. These have
been developed in line with medically accepted definitions of infertility and are
evolving continually. As illustrated above, however, any effective regulatory
framework will have to contend with the controversy surrounding the establishment of a generally agreed upon definition of infertility, and by implication,
who may be eligible for what forms of medical treatment. In the absence of such
social consensus, any suggested regulatory framework would need to allow
flexibility to account for differing outlooks on the definition, prevention and
treatment of infertility.
[
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The regulation of reproductive technologies in Canada currently involves consideration of various statutes, case law and the Constitution Act, 1982. In this
section we will consider existing legislation and related case law concerning the
transfer and storage of human tissues, as well as the constitutional constraints
imposed by the division of powers and the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms ("Charter") together with the related body of common law. In addition, we will review the proposed legislation put before the order paper of the
35th Parliament, Bill C-47, Human Reproductive and Genetic Technologies
Act't5 which would have prohibited specific RTs and certain related forms of
medical practice.
The legal regulation of RTs may be broadly classified under the categories of
public or private law. The former involves statutory regulation by governments
and the latter involves judicial resolution of disputes among private parties at
common law. Private ordering may be challenged under human rights legislation, whereas public regulation may, in addition, face review under the Constitution Act. There are those who argue that human reproduction and medical research properly belong to the private sphere and should not be restricted by
public regulation unless there are exceptionally compelling reasons. These
voices effectively propose a free market for RTs using liberal arguments in opposition to government intrusion. This argument equates medical laboratories
with the bedroom in the home as sites of human reproduction. It is further argued that government regulation would produce a "chilling" effect on medical
research and development of RTs. Others, however, reply that private ordering
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Being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter "Constitution Act"].
Part I of the Constitution Act, ibid. [hereinafter the "Charter"].
Supra, note 42.
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merely shelters actual or potential unethical medical research and practice from
public scrutiny.
In Canada, there has been no comprehensive legislative response to the legal
issues raised by reproductive technologies. Moreover, there has been only limited litigation and therefore there is little case law and common law guidance in
this area. In the absence of express law, RTs may be implicated in a number of
ways, for example, under the heads of human tissue legislation, property law,
contracts, torts, criminal law, the regulation of professions, and constitutional
law. In the absence of existing legislation and case law directly applicable to
RTs, these areas of law become important for regulation.

tion, Quebec, Newfoundland, and the Yukon, under family law, have regulated
the use of donor sperm.72 These provinces have legislated the presumption that
the male partner of a woman inseminated with donor sperm is deemed the father
of the child if he consented to the donor insemination. Quebec is the only province to have regulated the use of donor eggs. The gestational mother in Quebec
is deemed to be the mother for legal purposes.53
Several provinces have also introduced legislation regulating the exchange of
human tissues, ostensibly for the purpose of controlling organ transplantation.
The legislation in most provinces involves the same definition for human tissue:
"includes an organ, but does not include any skin, bone, blood, blood constituent or other tissue that is replaceable by natural processes of repair." 54 Canadian
courts, however, have not yet had the opportunity to consider the application of
this provincial legislation to the donation of gametes and embryos. It thus remains questionable whether courts will interpret gametes (sperm and ova) as
"human tissue." One might argue that gametes are genetically unique and
"replaceable by natural processes of repair," like blood. On the other hand,
while embryos are genetically unique, they are not exactly replaceable. We will
further discuss human tissue legislation later in this chapter.
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Although the federal and provincial governments have not yet committed themselves to a comprehensive response to the Royal Commission's recommendations, some relevant legislation has been introduced. Under regulations of the
Food and Drugs Act,47 which became enforceable June 1, 1996, the federal government controls the processing, testing and distribution of semen for donor
insemination." These regulations now require that semen be quarantined for at
least six months to test for HIV and various diseases and genetic conditions."
The Excise Tax Act" also regulates the importation of human sperm.51 In addi-
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For discussion on RTs in other jurisdictions see, E. Bernat, "Towards a New Legal Regulation
of Medically Assisted Reproduction: The Austrian Approach" (1992) 11 Medicine and Law
547; B. Knoppers & E. Sloss, "Recent Developments: Legislative Reforms in Reproductive
Technology" (1986) 18 Ottawa L. Rev. 663; Royal Commission, Proceed with Care: Final Report of The Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies (Ottawa: Minister of Supply
and Services Canada, 1992); Law Reform Commission, supra, note 27; L. Jonsson,
"Regulation of Reproductive Technologies in Sweden" in L. Weir, ed., Governing Medically
Assisted Human Reproduction: Report of an International Symposium (Toronto: Centre of
Criminology, University of Toronto, 1997) at 87; L. Wailer, "Australian Legislation on Infertility Treatments" in L. Weir, ed., ibid., at 91; J. Woodside, "The Role and Function of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority: Legislation, Regulation and Consultation" in L.
Weir, ed., ibid., at 97.
'°
Food and Drugs Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-27.
48
Processing and Distribution of Semen for Assisted Conception Regulations, SOR/96-254 under
the Food and Drugs Act, ibid. The regulations also follow the Guidelines for Therapeutic Donor Insemination 1992/3, "as amended from time-to-time," and published by the Canadian
Fertility and Andrology Society. Sections 5 to 8 allow for the importation of tested semen, if
additional processing criteria are met, including written notice to the Director. In addition, the
regulations require specific procedures be undertaken pertaining to screening, laboratory controls, labelling, records and tracing of semen; ss. 9-18.
49 Ibid., s. 4. (l)(b).
50
R.S.C. 1985, c. E-15.
51
Various acts to amend the Excise Tax Act, ibid., have described human sperm using the language of property: Goods and Services Tax Act, S.C. 1990, c. 45, s. 180(1) and Excise Tax Act,
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In response to growing public concerns, the Government of Canada appointed
the Royal Commission in October 1989. The mandate empowered the Royal
Commission to examine: "[the] implications of new reproductive technologies
for women's reproductive health and well-being," "the causes, treatment and
prevention of male and female infertility," various reproductive and related
technologies; "social and legal arrangements, the status and rights of people
using or contributing to reproductive services," and "the economic ramifications
of these technologies."" The Royal Commission set forth an "ethic of care"
framework and a guiding, though inexhaustive, set of eight ethical principles for
decision-making: "individual autonomy, equality, respect for human life and
dignity, protection of the vulnerable, non-commercialization of reproduction,
S.C. 1993, c. 27, s. 180(2) address the importation of human sperm: R.S.C. 1985, E-15, Sch.
VI, "Zero-Rated Supplies" Part I, s. 5 considers "a supply of human sperm" under the heading
of prescription drugs and biologicals deemed "zero-rated supplies" for purposes of GST appli52
53
54

cation.
See Children's Act, R.S.Y.T. 1986, c. 22, s. 13; arts. 538, 539 CCQ.
See art. 53, CCQ.; L.Q. 1991, c. 64.
For example, see Human Tissue Gift Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H. 20, s. 1; Human Tissue Gift Act,
R.S.A. 1980, c. H-12, s. 1(b); Human Tissue Gift Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 211,s. 1. But see also
alienate a part of his [sic] body
CCQ 1991, c. 64, art. 19, which states that a person may
only if that part is capable of regeneration and provided that no serious risk to his [sic] health
"...

55

56

results." Article 20 of the CCQ requires that "[t]he alienation must be gratuitous unless its object is a part of the body susceptible to regeneration."
The Royal Commission was established under Part I of the Inquiries Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-li,
with a mandate by Order in Council Nos. P.C. 1989-2150 (October 1989) and P.C. 1991-524
(March 1991).
Royal Commission, supra, note 46 at 3.
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appropriate use of resources, accountability, and balancing of individual and
collective interests" ;57 in doing so, the Royal Commission promoted "mutual
care and connectedness" between individuals, families and communities .58 The
Royal Commission further elaborated, "[t]he ethic of care means that a large
part of ethical deliberation is concerned with how to build relationships and prevent conflict, rather than being concerned only with resolving conflicts that have
already occurred." The interests of individuals and communities thus may be
considered interdependent."
Under an "ethic of care" framework, the Royal Commission analyzed much
empirical evidence and formalized its position on the regulation of new reproductive and genetic technologies in Canada. In November 1993, the Royal
Commission made public 293 recommendations, concluding that "decisive,
timely, and comprehensive national action is required with respect to the regulation of new reproductive technologies."' In particular, the Royal Commission
called for legislation to set clear boundaries around acceptable and nonacceptable uses of new reproductive and genetic technologies and to regulate
and monitor the use of acceptable practices and developments in this field. To
achieve this goal, the Royal Commission stated that the federal government
should use its power under the Criminal Code" to prohibit practices that
"because of their unsafe or unethical character [are] considered unacceptable
under any circumstances . 12 In addition, the Royal Commission recommended
the establishment of a national regulatory commission charged with the responsibility of setting and enforcing standards for those practices deemed acceptable.
The major functions of this proposed national commission were to be:
"licensing and monitoring; guideline and standard setting; informatibn collection, evaluation, and dissemination; records storage; consultation, coordination,
and intergovernmental cooperation; and monitoring of future technologies and
practices.""
In July 1995, the federal Minister of Health, the Honourable Diane Marleau,
called for an interim moratorium on specific applications of new reproductive
and genetic technologies, and announced the appointment of an advisory
committee to monitor compliance with the moratorium.' In June 1996, the federal government introduced Bill C-47, An Act Respecting Human Reproductive
11

Technologies and Commercial Transactions Relating to Human Reproduction

(in short, The Human Reproductive and Genetic Technologies Act), providing

58
59
60

Regulating Reproductive Technologies in Canada

Canadian Health Law and Policy

Ibid., at 53.
Ibid., at 50
Ibid., at 52.
Ibid., at 107.
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R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
Supra, note 55 at 108.
63
Ibid.,atll5-16.
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for criminal sanctions for the most serious acts including those named in the
moratorium. The Bill would prohibit "practices that commercialize reproduction
or are inconsistent with the principles of human dignity, including the buying
and selling of eggs and sperm, sex selection for non-medical reasons, and commercial surrogacy."65
Bill C-47, if enacted, would have prohibited specific genetic manipulation,
the payment of surrogate mothers, the purchase and sale of reproductive materials, and the use of ovum without consent. Section 3 lists the Bill's objects:
(a) to protect the health and safety of Canadians in the use of human reproductive
materials for assisted reproduction, other medical procedures and medical research;
(b) to ensure the appropriate treatment of human reproductive materials outside
the body in recognition of their potential to form human life; and
(c) to protect the dignity of all persons, in particular children and women, in relation to uses of human reproductive materials.

The Bill C-47 would prohibit any person from knowingly [to paraphrase s. 4(1)]
manipulating ova or embryos; fertilizing animals with human sperm, or vice
versa; fusing animal and human embryos, or implanting animal embryos into
humans, or vice versa; altering the genetic structure of gametes and embryos if
secjiiddfenerations; retrievTr
such alteration is
fthThTiFifiöii6ffriáuring, fertilthovum or sperm from a fetus or cada
izing or implanting 1hiim --n a woman ii isid the hurñàn body; using
techniques to ascertain and/or select the sex of the embryo, other than for
reasons related to health; maintaining an embryo outside the human body; or
causing the fertilization of an ovum outside the human body for purposes of
research. Sections 4(2) and (3) would also prohibit a person from offering or
giving consideration to carry out any procedure above. Moreover, s. 5 would
preclude any person from giving or offering consideration to a woman to act as
a surrogate mother, or to any person acting as an intermediary in obtaining such
services. Section 6(1) would also prohibit the selling, purchasing, bartering, or
exchanging of gametes, embryos and fetuses. Furthermore, the donor's consent
for the specific use of sperm or ovum would be required under ss. 7(1) and (2).
It may also be implied that the consent of both donors is necessary for the specific use of embryos for research or implantation in a woman. Section 2 defines
a "donor" as "the person who produces the ova or sperm, whether or not for
purposes of donation." Bill C-47 would also establish a range of punishment
from serious fines to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years.
Bill C-47 received a range of responses, including much criticism of the government's use of criminal prohibitions.60 For example, the Canadian Bar Asso-

62

64

Health Canada, News Release 1996-44 (Ottawa, 14 June 1996). See J. Woodard "Policy Experimentation in a Petri Dish" (14 August, 1995) 10:30 Western Report 36. See also New Reproductive Technologies: Setting Boundaries, Enhancing Health (Ottawa: Supply and Services
Canada, 1996) at 24-26. Marleau's narrow response may have been directly related to the Royal
Commission's position against a general moratorium; see Royal Commission, ibid., at IS.

Health Canada, ibid.; Bill C-47, Human Reproductive and Genetic Technologies Act, 2nd Sess.,
35th Parl., 1996, ss. 3-7.
66
See the Canadian Bar Association, "Submission on Bill C-47"; A. Young, "Brief Prepared for
the Standing Committee on Health on Bill C-47; P. Healy, "Statutory Prohibitions and the

65
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ciation ("CBA") strongly criticized the use of absolute criminal prohibitions for
failing to balance "individual autonomy" and "the dangers inherent in the use of
the technology."" They also discussed concerns for the "chilling effect" on research and clinical practice. The CBA supported policy guidelines that would
allocate a determinative role to the professions in self-regulation and to patient
autonomy. While supporting scientific freedom, the CBA criticized several
provisions of Bill C-47 for their "highly scientific" and "inaccessible" language.
The CBA expressed concern over the "complexity, overbreadth and lack of
precision" of the legislation in particular given the absolute criminal prohibitions. The CBA recommended a "simpler, clearer, and more precise definition
of offences," with the integration of popular terms and scientific description."
The law, the CBA noted, must be kept abreast of "evolving scientific and social
norms."69 Bill C-47 was also criticized for its lack of focus and unenforceability.7° According to another commentator, a regulatory framework seems preferable to the use of criminal law sanctions, which may create an underground
market for human reproduction .7' A regulatory framework might better support
women's reproductive autonomy, while avoiding problems in reaching a public
consensus, the unavailability of donors, and the potential exploitation of women
within an underground market.72
At the same time as the introduction of Bill C-47, the federal government
published a White Paper, entitled New Reproductive Technologies: Setting
Boundaries, Enhancing Health" promising to establish a regulatory body and
framework within which the regulation of acceptable practices would take place.
The White Paper set forth boundaries for public discussion about an appropriate
"legislative and regulatory infrastructure."' The paper identified several guiding
ethical principles for a policy framework: balancing individual and collective
interests; equality; protecting the vulnerable; appropriate use of medical treatment; non-commercialization of reproduction and reproductive materials; and
accountability." A two-step enactment process was proposed for legislation that
would eventually combine prohibitions (under Bill C-47) and regulatory controls to provide for "a comprehensive management regime for new reproductive
and genetic technologies."" Any such regime would promote a multidisciplinary
approach, and would be established under an agency removed from central gov-

ernment.77 The proposed regime would centre on the issuance of licences for
various new reproductive and genetic technologies and related practices, and the
establishment of appropriate standards by a range of enforcement mechanisms,
as well as information registries and health surveillance procedures. In what
seems to be a response to the uncertainty over division of powers, or a new
trend of intergovernmental co-operation, the Federal government offered to suspend federal regulatory controls in provinces with substantially similar controls.
This type of option would seem to increase flexibility in federal-provincial relations while upholding general uniformity in the regulation of new reproductive
and genetic technologies.
Under the various pressures of an upcoming federal election, however, the
proposed regime failed to materialize and Bill C-47 died on the order paper. It
appears that the voluntary moratorium will continue in effect until the enactment
of appropriate legislation. The issue thus remains alive as to whether a prohibitory regime under criminal law, a regulatory regime, or some combination,
one that best
would best provide a flexible means for social control of RTs
adapts to changing technologies and social norms.

Regulation of New Reproductive Technologies Under Federal Law in Canada" (1995) 40
McGill L.J. 905.
67
Canadian Bar Association, ibid.
68
Ibid., at 12.
69
Ibid., at 16.
70

Ibid.

Healy, supra, note 66.
Young, supra, note 66. The Supreme Court of Canada decision of R. v. Morgenraler, [1988] 1
S.C.R. 30 has often been cited for constitutional support of a woman's reproductive autonomy
in the context of abortion.
°
See New Reproductive Technologies: Setting Boundaries, Enhancing Health, sup ra, note 64.
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Prior to legislative drafting, governments must consider constitutional dimensions. RTs must be regulated according to the division of powers of the Constitution Act, 1867, and must also meet the guarantees under the Charter.
1. Division of Powers
Sections 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867, set forth the division of powers between the federal and provincial governments. Section 91 distributes legislative jurisdiction to the federal government as a matter of "national interest and
concern" under the criminal law [s. 91(27)], trade and commerce [s. 91(2)],
taxation [s. 91(3)], federal spending (as inferred from various sections), and
treaty powers (as inferred), as well as the residual category of peace, order and
good government.79 Under s. 92, the provinces have legislative jurisdiction for
matters of property and civil rights [s. 92(13)], hospitals [s. 92(7)], and the residual category of matters of a merely local or private nature in the province s.
92(16)]. The courts have generally recognized that Parliament or the provincial
legislatures have jurisdiction over a specific area if it falls in "pith and substance" under an enumerated category. However, the constitutionality of federal
or provincial legislation is not undermined where the legislation has an incidental effect on other enumerated categories. As well, the courts have recognized

71

72

"
76

mid.
Ibid., at 15-17.
Ibid., at 27.

78
79

Ibid.
(U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3.
M. Jackman, "The Constitution and the Regulation of New Reproductive Technologies," in
Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies, vol. 3, Overview of Legal Issues in
New Reproductive Technologies (Ottawa: Ministry of Supply and Services, 1993) 1.
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that a matter may have a "double aspect" in that it falls under provincial jurisdiction for one purpose, and federal jurisdiction for another purpose.8°
It has been argued that the very fact the federal government initiated the
Royal Commission is evidence enough to pull it under federal jurisdiction as a
"national concern."8' Parliament may also find the power to regulate RTs under
other areas, including criminal law, trade and commerce, taxing, federal spending, and treaty powers. Parliament could possibly regulate reproductive technologies under the Canada Health Act.82 However, even if the federal government can regulate RTs under one or more of these categories, the provinces may
nonetheless regulate incidental effects under, for example, their powers over
hospitals and health plans.
The federal and provincial governments have not yet formally addressed issues of standardization and uniformity for the definition and treatment of infertility, access criteria, and funding of RTs. It remains to be seen in which ways
mutual co-operation will be required of federal and provincial governments, in
light of the Constitution Act, 1867. A regulatory framework at the federal level
may address not only the rapidly changing RTs and social norms, but also
changing tensions between federal-provincial relations. It seems, nevertheless,
that many unfolding issues concerning the regulation and effects of RTs, and
particularly the uncertainty in the use and disposition of human "materials," are
best a matter for legislatures (as a more representative body) and not the elite
institutions of courts.

to biological parenthood, and the issue of legal status of gametes and embryos,
as they arise over subsequent sections in this chapter.
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2. The Charter
The Charter guarantees rights and freedoms except where the government can
show reasonable and demonstrable justification in a free and democratic society.
The Charter only applies to government conduct and legislation; it does not
directly concern private activities." The governmental regulation of RTs may
face Charter scrutiny under various sections, including s. 7 (the right to life,
liberty and security of the person) and s. 15 (equality). There are a number of
issues involving the use of RTs which are likely to require Charter analysis,
among these are: the "right" to biological parenthood through the use of and
access to RTs, and whether or not the rights and interests of surrogate mothers,
gamete donors, embryos and fetuses may be recognized under the Charter. In
the absence of Canadian jurisprudence, some limited guidance may be gathered
from American and other foreign jurisprudence on similar constitutional issues.
We will address Charter issues, specifically the issue of access through a right

80
81
82
83

For an interesting and detailed discussion, see Jackman, ibid.
Ibid., at 5.

R.S.C. 1985, c. C-6.
See Eldridge v. British Columbia (AG.), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624 (equality of rights for disabled's
access to sign language interpreters as covered under a publicly funded scheme and where the
Medical Services Commission has discretion over the expenditure and thus provision of medical care services).

Canadian courts at common law have not yet had the opportunity to directly
consider the regulation of reproductive technologies. However, several cases
have dealt indirectly with the standards for medical practice concerning reproductive technologies and the status and quality of sperm donation. In Korn v.
Potter" the British Columbia Supreme Court affirmed a human rights tribunal
decision that a physician's refusal to provide artificial insemination to a lesbian
couple was discriminatory on the basis of sexual orientation. The court noted
that discrimination could not be sanctioned merely on the basis that other physicians provided the same services.
In ter Neuzen v. Korn85 the Supreme Court of Canada considered the case of a
woman who underwent artificial insemination and contracted HIV through the
donated semen. She claimed negligence against her physician, and that the prevailing medical standards were inappropriate. She also argued the existence of
an implied condition or warranty under contract law and the Sale of Goods Act.86
The Court affirmed the presence of two fundamental aspects of a claim of professional negligence: (1) breach of duty arising from the failure to be aware of
the risk of HIV infection through the use of artifical insemination; and (2)
breach of duty with respect to the screening and follow-up of donors. The Court
also, for the first time, faced the issue of whether an implied warranty exists at
common law that semen be of merchantable quality and fit for its purpose. The
Court first rejected the argument under the Sale of Goods Act, which only applies if a contract existed for the sale of "primarily" goods rather than medical
services.87 The Court then considered the specific nature of the contract and the
relationship between the parties in order to determine whether the parties intended to imply such a warranty at common law. The Court noted the medical
context and vulnerability of physicians, stating that "it must be recognized
that biological products such as blood and semen, unlike manufactured prod.,,88 The Court held that no implied warranty
ucts, carry certain inherent risks
of fitness and merchantability could exist in the circumstances, and if such a
warranty did exist, it would be met by the physician's reasonable care.89 The

(1996), 134 D.L.R. (4th) 437 (B.C.S.C.).
[1995] 3 S.C.R. 674.
86
R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 410.
87
The Court, however, did not consider the issue of whether the sperm was donated rather than
sold.
80
Supra, note 85 at 717.
89 It has been previously argued that the transfer of sperm should be legally characterized as a
"sale" in order to resort to the protection of commercial law; A.M. Hodgson, "The Warranty of
Sperm: A Modest Proposal to Increase the Accountability of Sperm Banks and Physicians in
the Performance of Artificial Insemination Procedures" (1993) 175 Specialty Law Digest:
Health Care Law 9. Hodgson claims that such characterization would hold sperm banks and
physicians liable for breach of implied warranties. This argument, however, does not address
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Supreme Court thus affirmed the Court of Appeal ruling, sending the case back
to trial,
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Most individuals who seek access to RTs, do so because they wish to have a
child and are either unable or unwilling to do so through sexual intercourse. Not
all individuals who want to use RTs will be able to do so. Access to reproductive technologies may be limited by a number of considerations including, for
example, formal or informal medical criteria and the high cost of treatment, in
some circumstances, decisions about access to RTs will be made by physicians
who screen applicants according to criteria established by private infertilit\
clinics or set out in professional guidelines. Provincial health insurance legislation may also provide a barrier to access by excluding certain forms of RTs as
an insured service under provincial health care insurance plans."Legislatures
may also enact legislation specifying who may have access to RTs and in what
circumstances. Where individuals encounter such barriers which limit their access to RTs, the barriers may be challenged under the Charter and/or provincial
Human Rights Codes. While challenges under human rights legislation may
provide recourse to individuals where the barrier to access is private action
for example, the decision of a physician
a Charter challenge will only be
available where access is limited by government action. We now focus on a few
of the more likely Charter challenges under ss. 7 and 15 and their relevance to
the regulation of RTs.
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Also included were questions about the couple's or individual's marital status,
the presence of a partner, and sexual orientation." Individuals and couples may
also face discriminatory barriers based on race and ethnicity.
Access criteria tend to vary among, clinics and across orovinces. raisine concerns over the uniform ity of standards and mobility barriers based on ass.92
The infertile may face additional impediments of treatment costs and physical
location of fertility clinics. High treatment costs can prohibit the infertile, who
lack the financial means and do not qualify for private or public health care insurance, from having access to RTs. Many individuals and couples who seek
access to RTs depend upon health care insurance as their only economic means
of funding access to RTs. However, few RTs are paid for under provincial
health insurance schemes. In Ontario, for example, the Ontario Health Insurance Plan ("OHIP") guidelines regulate such funding and thus establish access
barriers. Women may access public funding for in vitro fertilization if they show
"complete bilateral anatomical fallopian tube blockage."93 This effectively
means deference to medical expertise and proof of bilateral blockage. Moreover,
OHIP only provides funding for up to three complete cycles of in vitro fertilization, and does not fund micro-manipulation techniques for the treatment of male
infertility, such as intracytoplasmic sperm injection. It seems, therefore, that the
definition and condition of infertility as a treatment response, as we previously
discussed, shapes accessibility to health care funding.

--

-

B. EXISTING BARRIERS
An individual or couple with the goal of increasing their chances for successful
reproduction may approach a physician in a private fertility clinic or public
hospital. The physician or clinic performs an assessment using a set of eligibility
criteria to screen access to reproductive technologies. The physician or clinic
must also determine whether the individual or couple would benefit overall from
such assistance. The criteria typically centre on the potential benefits and risks
to the health and safety of participants based on various medical factors, including the condition of infertility and the participant's age. A number of studies
have also identified other non-medical factors that some physicians have
adopted as criteria to limit access to in vitro fertilization. These criteria include
questions concerning an individual woman's or couple's ability to parent. Factors some practitioners considered relevant to successful parenting included:
psychological immaturity; below average intelligence; physical disability; other
children living with the prospective parents; low income; and place of residence.
the inadequacies of commercial law in dealing with sensitive reproductive "materials" of a
unique nature.
90 See for example the Ontario Health Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H. 6.

Any regulatory framework which limits access to RTs may face challenges under the Charter. The Charter may be invoked to challenge statutory provisions
and regulations that limit access directly on the basis of medical factors as well
as those which restrict access indirectly on the basis of listed services under
provincial health insurance plans. We can identify at least three clusters of
constitutional arguments which could be invoked in order to gain access to RTs.
Broadly speaking, an argument for a positive "right to procreate" may be constructed on the basis of s. 7 rights to liberty. Alternatively, access to reproductive technologies could be sought using s. 7 on the grounds that it includes the
right to health care and that access to RTs is an instrinsic component of such a
positive right to health care. Both these grounds require an affirmation of some
positive right, i.e., either the right to procreate, or the right to health care. A
third basis from which to challenge access to RTs is s. 15. Where government
legislation or action provides some individuals access to RTs but not others, it

91

Royal Commission, Proceed With Care: Final Report of the Royal Commission on New Repro-

ductive Technologies (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1992), at 552, citing T.
Stephens & J. McLean, "Survey of Canadian Fertility Programs," Royal Commission on New
Reproductive Technologies, vol. 10 (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1993)
table 16.
92
Royal Commission, ibid., at 552.
R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 552, amended to 0. Reg. 410/96, s. 23.
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may be possible to claim discrimination where such access is denied to individuals who are members of an enumerated or analogous class under s. 15. This
line of argument would claim access to RTs as a negative right. The categorization of positive and negative rights is important in light of the Supreme Court of
Canada's reluctance to recognize socio-economic rights under the Charter generally, and specifically, under s. 7.
A Charter challenge places the onus on the parties seeking access to RTs to
show that a right or freedom has been infringed in legislative purpose or effect.
Once the infringement is established, the focus turns to s. 1 of the Charter where
the onus shifts to the government to show that the legislation is reasonable and
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. The person seeking access under s. 7 of the Charter must also demonstrate that the deprivation of life,
liberty or security of the person is not in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. Where a prescribed law, in purpose or effect, amounts to such
a deprivation, then the analysis shifts to s. 1.
Section 7 of the Charter states that: "Everyone has the right to life, liberty
and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice." The first analytical step is
to determine whether life, liberty or security of the person has been deprived by
legislation or government conduct. In light of recent trends in Canadian courts,
the regulation of access to RTs is unlikely to fall within the right not to be deprived of life." In other words, Canadian courts have not yet shown any interest
in supporting a right to biological parenthood as essential to one's life.
A more fruitful line of argument might be to establish a positive right to procreate under Canadian constitutional law. A 1993 Report by the LRC of Canada
discusses a positive right to procreate and concludes: "it seems likely that either
liberty or security of the person, or both, will be found in a future case to include the right to procreate."95 The Charter does not expressly include a right to
procreate; however, it has been argued if such a right exists in Canada, it is most
likely to be protected within s. 7 of the Charter and more specifically could be
encompassed by the right to liberty or security of the person.
Section 7 has been raised in a reproductive context in two cases before the
Supreme Court of Canada: R. v. Morgentaler" and E. (Mrs.) v. Eve.97 However,
it is only in the former that the Court addressed substantive interests involving
reproductive claims. Relying on an expansive interpretation of the right to liberty, Wilson J. stated that the right to liberty in s. 7 of the Charter "guarantees to
every individual a degree of personal autonomy over important decisions intimately affecting their private lives."98 With respect to the decision whether to
terminate a pregnancy, Wilson J. argued that:
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Law Reform Commission of Canada, Medically Assisted Procreation (Working Paper 65)
(Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1992) at 152.
95
Ibid., at 164.
96
[1988] 1 S.C.R. 30.
[19861 2 S.C.R. 388.
98 Morgentaler, supra, note 96 at 171. In R. v. Jones,
[1986] 2 S.C.R. 284 at 318, Justice Wilson
affirmed that this broad conception of liberty ought to be protected by s. 7. In Jones, the plain-
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This decision is one that will have profound psychological, economic and social
It is a decision that deeply reflects the
consequences for the pregnant woman
way the woman thinks about herself and her relationship to others and to society at
large. It is not just a medical decision; it is a profound social and ethical one as
well. Her response to it will be the response of the whole person.99
...

In protecting a sphere of reproductive liberty in relation to a woman's abortion
decision, Wilson J. acknowledges that such a choice falls within the realm of
decisions which are protected from state interference by the right to liberty. In
articulating the conception of liberty protected by the Charter, Wilson J. relied
upon a series of American cases which have held that the right to privacy, while
not expressly enumerated in the American Constitution and its Amendments, is
an aspect of the right to liberty and includes the right to procreate.'°° One could
argue that Wilson J.'s conception of liberty in Morgentaler supports the view
that a general prohibition on the use of RTs would constitute an infringement of
s. 7 as such a prohibition could infringe personal autonomy over important decisions that fundamentally affect the way a woman thinks about herself and her
relationship to others.
In E. (Mrs.) v. Eve, the Supreme Court of Canada considered whether a court
had the power, pursuant to its parens patriae jurisdiction, to authorize the contraceptive sterilization of a mentally disabled woman and whether such a sterilization would be in the woman's best interests. In concluding that courts do not
have jurisdiction to authorize a non-consensual sterilization for non-therapeutic
purposes, La Forest J. writing for the Court stated that:
The grave intrusion on a person's rights and the certain physical damage that ensues from non-therapeutic sterilization without consent, when compared to the
highly questionable advantages that can result from it, have persuaded me that it
can never safely be determined that such a procedure is for the benefit of that per-

tiff argued that an Alberta legislative regime regarding educational instruction violated his parental rights to educate his own children as he saw fit contrary to the s. 7 right to liberty. In her
dissent, Wilson J. stated at 318 that:
I believe that the framers of the Constitution in guaranteeing 'liberty' as a fundamental
value in a free and democratic society had in mind the freedom of the individual to develop and realize his potential to the full, to plan his own life to suit his own character,
to make his own choices for good or ill to be 'his own person' and accountable as
such.
sn Morgentaler, supra, note 96 at 171.
°°
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) at 541, holding that the forced sterilization of habitual criminals violated the equal protection clause. In his opinion, Douglas J. characterized the
right to reproduce as "one of the basic civil rights of man." Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972) at 453, in which Brennan J. for the majority recognized that the right to privacy includes
"the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a
child"; Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) recognizing that the right to personal privacy includes the choice to use contraceptives to avoid procreation; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973), recognizing the right to abortion as an aspect of the right to privacy.
...

...
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son. Accordingly, the procedure should never be authorized for non-therapeutic
purposes under the parens patriae jurisdiction.""
In coming to this conclusion, La Forest J. did not find it necessary to rely on the
Charter. Therefore, whether there is a constitutionally protected right to procreate has yet to be determined. However, throughout his decision, La Forest J. did
suggest that there was a "growing legal recognition of the fundamental character
of the right to procreate "102 and that a non-consensual sterilization would Constitute a deprivation of this right. As noted by the LRC:
Justice La Forest pointed out the "growing legal recognition of the fundamental
character of the right to procreate," "the great privilege of giving birth," and "[t]he
importance of maintaining the physical integrity of a human being
particularly
as it affects the privilege of giving life." He characterized the proposed steriliza...

tion as a "grave intrusion on a person's rights" and an "irreversible and serious intrusion on the basic rights of the individual.""
It remains to be seen whether Canadian courts will accept an interpretation of s.
7 that supports individual autonomy in procreation. Moreover, even if the courts
were to find a right to procreate protected by s. 7 of the Charter, this right may
be viewed as a negative right
the right to be able to procreate without state
interference
and not a positive right to medically assisted procreation.
Unless the Charter protects a right to procreate, arguably, the question of
whether government has a positive obligation to make RTs generally available
does not arise. This is not to suggest that if the government does enact legislation or regulations, or take action to provide or regulate RTs, that such action
will not be subject to Charter scrutiny particularly under s. 15. It may be argued
by some however, that s. 7 should be interpreted as creating a positive right to
basic social services, including the right to health care.'°4 The claim is that such
services are fundamental to protecting the values of life, liberty and security of
the person enshrined in the Charter. However, even if s. 7 of the Charter is
found to guarantee the right to health care, it is unlikely that access to RTs
would be included under the framework of protected services. Rather, it is likely
that a distinction will be drawn between basic health care services which are
necessary to sustain life and basic well-being, and those services such as RTs,
whose absence, while impoverishing one's quality of life, do not threaten life
-

-
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Supra, note 97 at 431.
Ibid., at 419-20.
Law Reform Commission, supra, note 94 at 163.
See generally, M. Jackman, "The Protection of Welfare Rights Under the Charter" (1988) 20
Ottawa L. Rev. 257; I. Morrison, "Security of the Person and the Person in Need: Section 7 and
the Right to Welfare" (1988) 4 J. L. & Soc. Pol'y 33: I. Johnstone, "Section 7 of the Charter
and the Right to Welfare" (1988) 46 U.T. Fac. L. Rev. 1; M. Jackman, "Poor Rights: Using the
Charter to Support Social Welfare Claims" (1993) 19 Queen's L.J. 65; B.F. Windwick,
"Health-Care and Section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms" (1994) 3:1
Health L. Rev. 20; Canadian Bar Association, Task Force on Health Care, What's Law Got To
Do With It?: Health Care Reform in Canada (Ottawa: Canadian Bar Association, 1994).
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itself. Therefore, it is not likely that the courts will interpret the Charter in a
manner which requires legislatures to provide access to RTs. However, where
governments do undertake to legislate with respect to the delivery of RTs, the
Charter may be invoked to ensure that this is carried out in a manner consistent
With s. 15.
Section 15 of the Charter provides a basis upon which to argue for nondiscriminatory access to reproductive technologies. Section 15(1) states that
"[e]very individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the
equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour,
religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability .11115 A law must not discriminate on enumerated or analogous grounds by design or by impact against particular individuals or groups. One could argue that the infertile as a group are
discriminated against as a matter of "physical disability." Grounds for access
would entail arguing that this group is prevented by the state from having children despite the existence of a remedy in the form of medical treatment using
RTs. However, even if the court finds infertility to be a physical disability and
that the infertile are discriminated against as a class, this need not result in mandatory access to RTs. The court may hold that alternative remedies (such as
adoption, for example) are available to mitigate this form of discrimination.
Where access to RTs is available only as an uninsured medical service, there
may be grounds to challenge the lack of provision of publicly insured access on
the grounds of socio-economic discrimination. However, since s. 15 properly
applies only to areas of positive state action, it would be difficult to employ unless it could be found that the decision not to fund access to RTs was deliberately discriminatory.
A more likely line of argument, therefore, would be to apply s. 15 to those
individuals and groups who are currently denied access to RTs under provincial
eligibility criteria, where, for example, provinces provide and insure access to
some but not to other couples or individuals. Access criteria which rely upon a
particular definition of infertility may be more susceptible to challenge under s.
15. Where these definitions appear to rule out or exclude certain groups, for
example, single lesbians, or lesbians in a conjugal relationship, but allow access
to married heterosexual couples there may be grounds for a finding of discrimination.106 The infertile may claim analogous grounds under s. 15(1), particularly
on the basis of social, political and legal disadvantage. 101 To the extent that infertility, by whatever cause, constitutes a disability, by providing access to RTs
to some groups but not others, the state may be construed to have favoured the
reproductive opportunities of some groups over others either by action or non-
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See Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 S .C .R. 143.
See Royal Commission, supra, note 91 at 426-38. Another issue not yet considered by the
courts is whether or not gay men can legally access RTs, for example, by way of surrogacy arrangements, in hopes of creating a new form of family.
See M. Jackman, "The Constitution and the Regulation of New Reproductive Technologies" in
Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies, vol. 3, Overview of Legal Issues in
New Reproductive Technologies (Ottawa: Ministry of Supply and Services, 1993) at 24-25.
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action. Economic arguments of budget constraint may not be used to systematically favour particular groups over others.
Provincial authorities (and indeed hospitals) may not be protected against
charges of discrimination by resorting to the argument that access criteria are
based on strictly medical-scientific factors. Some argue that where access
criteria for in vitro fertilization, for example, are based strictly on medical
infertility, then discrimination is unlikely to occur.'°8 Such arguments ignore
the bias inherent in these criteria, which may mask the subjective preferences
and social prejudices both of those who devise such criteria as well as those
medical practitioners who apply them. The Royal Commission formally recommended that: "[a]ccess to in vitro fertilization treatment be determined on
the basis of legitimate medical criteria, without discrimination on the basis of
factors such as marital status, sexual orientation, or economic status."°9 It remains unclear how the Royal Commission would separate, if possible, criteria
involving both biological and social dimensions. In any event, the Royal
Commission has provided guidance in its sharp criticism of discriminatory
barriers to access RTs.
A recent case has been brought before the Nova Scotia Supreme Court involving a s. 15 challenge to the access criteria applied under the Nova Scotia
Health Services and Insurance Act"' for the provision of in vitro fertilization
and intracytoplasmic sperm injection."' The plaintiff argued that the failure to
provide intracytoplasmic sperm injection constituted discrimination on the
grounds of disability. In Cameron v. Nova Scotia (A.G.),"2 Kennedy C.J. presented a lengthy discussion on the relative ineffectiveness and newness of in
vitro fertilization and intracytoplasmic sperm injection before ruling that these
procedures are not "medically necessary" or "medically required.""' It was
noted that the policy underlying the Nova Scotia Health Services and Insurance
Act, as a product of consultation between the government and the medical society, represents a reasonable method for the establishment of health priorities and
the allocation of limited funding."' In response to the couple's Charter ss. 7 and
15 arguments, it was held that the policy makes a distinction in law that is not
discriminatory on the basis of physical disability. Justice Kennedy stated: "the
non-funding is based on the nature of the treatment being sought, rather than the
personal characteristics of those persons seeking the funding, the infertile ."5 It
was further noted that to find that public funding of particular medical services
falls under Charter s. 7 (right to life, liberty or security of the person) would
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expand the parameters of judicial review. 116 In finding that Charter ss. 7 and 15
were not infringed, Kennedy C.J. did not undertake a s. 1 analysis. This case
illustrates the kinds of grounds upon which s. 15 may be used by individuals to
ain access to RTs, and underlines the relevance of constitutional jurisprudence
to the problem of access to RTs in Canada.
If s. 7 or s. 15 of the Charter have been infringed by prescribed law, then the
onus shifts to the government under s. 1 to show that its limits are reasonable
and demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. 117 Canadian courts
have not yet had the opportunity to scrutinize access criteria under the s. 1
Oakes test of rational connection, minimal impairment and proportionality."'
For example, the purpose or objective of government legislation might be to
ameliorate discrimination against infertile women and men as a group who have
suffered an historical disadvantage."' It may be that "medically required services" under a public insurance scheme must be available to the infertile in the
context of a health care system with finite resources. It has also been argued that
such a determination should include the medical effects of the condition, the
effectiveness of treatment, alternative treatments and relative costs."' On the
other hand, one might argue that access to RTs as a "required service" to overcome the condition of infertility should be available to the rich and the poor
alike on the basis of reasonable access to a publicly-funded health insurance
system.
SJ

I

1111X4J l

Access to RTs by infertile individuals requires adequate information and
counselling upon which to base a decision and consent to treatment. Consent
to RTs involves a two-way process where formal or informal access criteria
are applied by physicians, and where women and men have the opportunity to
choose freely to accept the use of RTs. Inadequate or lack of relevant infor"
Ibid., atpara. 160.
117 The basic framework for as. 1 analysis has been set forth in R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103.
118 R. v. Oakes, ibid. The analytical framework for determining whether a statutory provision is a

reasonable limit demonstrably justifiable under s. 1 has been summarized in Egan v. Canada,
[1995] 2 S.C.R. 513 at 605 per lacobucci J., as recently quoted with approval by La Forest J. in
Eldridge v. British Columbia (AG.), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624 at 684, and by Cory and lacobucci JJ.
in Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493 at 554:
A limitation to a constitutional guarantee will be sustained once two conditions are met.
First, the objective of the legislation must be pressing and substantial. Second, the
means chosen to attain this legislative end must be reasonable and demonstrably justifiable in a free and democratic society. In order to satisfy the second requirement, three
criteria must be satisfied: (1) the rights violation must be rationally connected to the aim
of the legislation; (2) the impugned provision must minimally impair the Charter guarantee; and (3) there must be a proportionality between the effect of the measure and its
objective so that the attainment of the legislative goal is not outweighed by the
abridgement of the right. In all s. 1 cases the burden of proof is with the government to
show on a balance of probabilities that the violation is justifiable.
119
See Law Reform Commission, supra, note 94 at 189.
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See Cameron, supra, note 111.
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mation concerning the potential benefits, costs, and risks of RTs, as well as
prejudiced forms of communication, might influence an individual's choice to
use RTs. It is important, therefore, that the communications between physi
cians and prospective patients remain mutually open and accessible. Consent
to RTs depends upon these communications. Moreover, it is through such
communications, necessary for informed consent, that non-visible discriminatory factors may become influential. In current practice, physicians may, under the facade of "legitimate medical criteria," inquire about the person's lifestyle, including sexual history and orientation. Keeping in mind that two
chapters in this text are devoted to consent, we now explore specific issues in
the context of RTs.
The common law in Canada requires that a physician obtaina patient's informed consent prior to performing a medical procedure on that patient."' This
means that the patient must be informed about the benefits and risks of treatment, alternative courses of action, and the consequences of not having the
treatment. Moreover, the standard for disclosure is not what the reasonable
physician would see fit to disclose, but what the reasonable person in the patient's position would want to know.122 The relevant information for in vitro
fertilization, for example, would include success rates of the procedure, including a clarification of the meaning of success rates (i.e., conception or live birth).
Patients should also be informed about the potential for multiple births and the
possibility of low birth-weight babies in addition to other social factors and financial costs. The precise nature of the information to be communicated by the
physician to the patient under informed consent in the context of reproductive
technologies has not been established by case law.
The physician may inform the patients directly, or refer them to counsellors. Independent counselling might avoid some concerns over a physician's
potential bias in providing treatment services. Moreover, independent counselling may support the timely provision of needed information on new and
changing reproductive technologies. The Royal Commission recognized the
importance of patients having "time to discuss and fully comprehend the
meaning and implications of consent," and that consent should be revocable
"at any stage of treatment without jeopardizing future care or treatment. "123
The Royal Commission recommended a standardization of informative materials, including alternatives to treatment, such as adoption and living without
children.
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B STATUS OF GAMETES AND EMBRYOS
A couple that decides to reproduce using RTs may part company, or one or both
or tnem may use, at some stage oi reproduction. iney iiiigui nave piaeeu Men
gametes (sperm and ova) separately in storage banks, or have already generated
an embryo also frozen and stored in a bank. In difficult cases, courts may be
called upon to determine the status of gametes and embryos, and who should
that is, who should
have an interest in, and dispositional control over them
have the power to control human reproductive materials and ultimately, human
Lploduction along specific genetic fines The law may protect the rights and
(the genetic contributors) of reproductive materials
inteieiisoI the
jitiL"parents," the biomedical researchers and clinical physicians
wh-ypfer the materials and help generate products of conception, hospitals
bind the owners ol storage and handling facilities the interests of these
law
• 6ducts' as potential life forms, and
might be called upon to address such issues in the staging and evaluation of lifeforming processes, from pre-conception arrangements to the definition of death.
The framing of the legal issues which arise will depend upon whether or not
gametes and embryos are considered as property, persons, or something inbetween. The following section explores law's responses to the status of reproductive "materials" (sperm and ova) and the "products" of conception (zygotes,
embryos, and fetuses)."' The primary issue of the status of gametes and embryos
implicates a range of existing law including: property, contracts, wills and trusts,
torts, criminal law and constitutional law.
-

1. A Property Approach
One approach to the characterization of gametes and embryos focuses on the
concept of property.'25 Property refers not to physical objects, but to "rights of
control or domination" over objects or activities. A traditional property approach treats sperm, ova, and embryos as objects to be controlled like any other.
The reason for this treatment as objects centres on their generation as a product
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Reibl v. Hughes (1980), 114 D.L.R. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.) provides the authoritative statement on the
law of informed consent in Canada. See also the Ontario Health Care Consent Act, 1996, SO.
1996, c. 2, Sch. A., which supersedes the common law in its broad application to treatment.
Section 2 of the Act defines treatment as "anything that is done for a therapeutic, preventive,
palliative, diagnostic, cosmetic or other health-related purpose includes [sic] a course of treatment or plan of treatment."

122

Ibid.

123

Royal Commission, supra, note 91 at 550.

331

The following section focuses on gametes, zygotes (pre-embryos), and embryos. For a more
detailed discussion on fetuses, see chap er 9, "State Intervention in the Lives of Pregnant
Women."
See M. Litman & G. Robertson, "Reproductive Technology: Is a Property Law Regime Appropriate?" in Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies, Overview of Legal Issues in
New Reproductive Technologies, Research vol. 3 (Minister of Supply and Services Canada,
1993) at 233; M. Litman & G. Robertson, "The Common Law Status of Genetic Material;" in
B. Knoppers, T. Caulfield & T.D. Kinsella, cdi., Legal Rights and Human Genetic Material
(Toronto Emond Montgomery,1996) at 51 IA' Hirtle Civil Law and the Status of Human
Genetic Material, in Legal Rights and Human Genetic Material," in B. Knoppers, T. Caulfield
& T.D. Kinsella, eds., ibid., at 85; 1. Kennedy, "The Moral Status of the Embryo," in I. Kennedy, Treat Me Right: Essays in Medical Law and Ethics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991) at
119; B. Steinbock, "Sperm as Property" (1995) 6 Stan. L. & Pol'y Rev. 57; B. Brown,
"Reconciling Property Law With Advances in Reproductive Science" (1995) 6 Stan. L. & Pol'y
Rev. 73; D. Walther, 'Ownership' of the Fertilized Ovum In Vitro" (1992)26 Fam. L.Q. 235.
"
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of one's body and the fact that they are alienable from it. According to some
proponents of a property model, each individual is said to have dominion and
control over her or his body, including its derivatives such as blood, sperm, ova
and embryos. 126 It has also been argued that each individual should have the
right to exclusively control the uniquely identifying information contained in
her or his genes. The argument in favour of viewing the body and its parts as
property is supported by the understanding that property is considered uniquely
personal and therefore private.'27 If my body and its parts do not belong to me,
then to whom do they belong? The primary motivation in favour of regarding
gametes and embryos as property therefore, is to ensure that the individual or
individuals who generated them has the full power to control their ultimate use.
Alternatively, some academics argue in favour of quasi-property approaches
where, for example, gametes would have special status as property.'28 A quasiproperty approach might affirm personal control and rights over disposition of
gametes and/or embryos, but deny the right to alienate these materials for commercial purposes or for remuneration. By considering policy issues in relation to
the specific facts of the case, one might locate the status of gametes and embryos somewhere along the spectrum ranging from traditional property, to a
unique form of quasi-property with the potential for life. By the former characterization, the individual's ownership of gametes would focus on possession to
the exclusion of all others; as such, gametes would be alienable according to the
expressed wishes of their owners. Moreover, an object may be property (in its
weakest form, without all traditional incidents) for some purposes but not others.'29 The potential suspension of reproductive stages, and the recognition of a
form of potential life, generates obvious concerns of de-humanization. By removing embryos and ova from the body, the only place where they had existed
prior to the avent of RTs, a de facto condition of objectification is created.
While the legal characterization of human reproductive materials has not been
considered in Canada, it has in other jurisdictions.
In Hecht v. Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Los
Angeles (Kane), "I the California Court of Appeal held that cryopreserved sperm
was a "unique category of property" as part of the estate of the deceased donor.'3' The value of the donor's sperm arose from its potential to generate life

Upon fertilization, thus providing the donor an interest "in the nature of ownership." In Davis v. Davis,"' the court directly confronted the issue of whether
oryopreserved pre-embryos are property. The Davis couple underwent in vitro
fertilization, storing their pre-embryos for later use. They eventually divorced,
leading to a custody battle over the "frozen" pre-embryos. Ms. Davis sought to
implant the embryos. She argued the "best interests of the child" test, and that
the pre-embryos were in fact "living persons." In opposition, Mr. Davis contended that the pre-embryos were under joint control. Justice Young of the Tennessee Circuit Court ruled in favour of parens patriae jurisdiction and the family law approach emphasizing the "best interests of the child," and thus rejecting
a traditional property approach.'33 In rejecting the "bailment" approach of York
v. Jones,"' Justice Young focused on a "minority" scientific opinion, suggesting
that the differentiation of cells in such embryos means that they are fully constituted, "living persons." When faced with legal classification, Young J. relied
upon medical science, in the absence of much discussion about the problems of
deference to medical science and the lack of critical inquiry and challenge.'35
By the time the case reached the Court of Appeal, both parties had remarried. Ms. Davis no longer wished to implant the pre-embryos, but instead
wanted to donate them to other women. Thus, the facts and perhaps the support
of public policy had changed direction. The Court of Appeal reversed the previous ruling, awarding instead joint control over the pre-embryos. In the Davis
case, the ex utero pre-embryos were frozen at an early stage of development.
The American Court recognized that Mr. Davis had a "constitutionally protected
right not to beget a child where no pregnancy has taken place ."36 Some academics have argued that the Davis analysis sounds "suspiciously property-like."37
And yet, the court's reference to the fact that the embryos had been created but
not yet implanted supports Ms. Davis' reproductive contribution in relation to
the father. At the same time, the court recognized the father's contribution and
his wish not to proceed. In the end, the husband received a complete "veto" over

126
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the disposition of the frozen ex utero pre-embryos. The Tennessee Supreme
Court affirmed the Court of Appeal decision."' The court, however, noted that
"pre-embryos are not, strictly speaking, either "persons" or "property," but occupy an interim category that entitles them to special respect because of their
potential for human life.""' The court focussed on the Davis' interest "in the
nature of ownership, to the extent that they have decisional authority ,"4" in light
of a balance of opposing interests by the two genetic contributors. The court in
Davis thus seems to suggest two exceptions to the right of one progenitor In
veto parenthood: (1) where one parent cannot otherwise become a parent; (2) a
prior agreement between the parties indicating their clear intentions for the disposition of embryos.
In Canada, the courts have yet to decide on the issue of whether or not reproductive materials should be considered as "property.""' Federal legislation, such
as the Food and Drugs Act'42 and the Excise Tax Act"' tend to invoke the language of property in that sperm may be "possessed" and "owned." It can be
argued that gametes and embryos are human tissues and therefore fall under
human tissue legislation. The Human Tissue Gift Act, " limits the transfer of
human "tissue," which "includes an organ, but does not include any skin, bone,
blood, blood constituent or other tissue that is replaceable by natural processes
of repair," providing for "gifts" only.'45 The Quebec civil law basically adheres
to the principle that the human body is not for sale; the law has not yet decided
upon such issues as "ownership" of body parts) The Civil Code of Quebec"
("CCQ") does not specifically address the issue of the ownership of donated
embryos. Article 19 of the CCQ states that "[a] person of full age who is capable
of giving his consent may alienate a part of his body inter vivos, provided the
risk incurred is not disproportionate to the benefit that may reasonably be anticipated." This form of risk balancing requires judges to carefully consider external sources in order to avoid, if possible, indeterminacy.
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Ibid. See Litman & Robertson, Reproductive Technology, supra, note 125 at 79.
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Litman & Robertson, Reproductive Technology, ibid., at 51. Litman and Robertson warn of the
symbolic and psychological effects on persons whose genetic materials and information are
characterized as property.
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R.S.C. 1985, c. F-27.
R.S.C. 1985, c. F-is.
' For example, see Human Tissue Gift Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H. 20, s. 1; Human Tissue Gift Act,
R.S.A. 1980, c. H-12, s. 1(b); Human Tissue Gift Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 211,s. 1. But see also
CCQ 1991, c. 64, art. 19, which states that a capable person may
alienate a part of his [sic]
body only if that part is capable of regeneration and provided that no serious risk to his [sic]
health results." Article 20 of the CCQ requires that "[t]he alienation must be gratuitous unless
its object is a part of the body susceptible to regeneration."
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For more examples, see other provincial legislation: ibid.
146
M. Ouellette, 'The Civil Code of Quebec and New Reproductive Technologies," in Royal
Commission on New Reproductive Technologies, Research vol. 3, Overview of Legal Issues to
New Reproductive Technologies (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1993) 625 at 643.
'°
S.Q. 1991, c. 64 (CCQ).
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141
Under s. 223(1) of the Criminal Code of Canada, "a child becomes a human being when it has completely proceeded, in a living state, from the body
of its mother." A fetus, and thus, by extension, gametes and embryos, cannot be
considered a legal person for the purposes of criminal law. 141 In the context of
striking down an abortion provision under the Criminal Code, the Supreme
Court of Canada indicated that a fetus does not have a separate s. 7 right from its
mother."' Embryos and fetuses do not have legal rights until they are born
alive."' Canadian common law has also endorsed the born alive rule. In Winnipeg Child and Family Services (Northwest Area) v. G.(D.F.)"' a seven-member
majority of the Supreme Court of Canada invoked the "born alive" rule and refused to restrict the activities of an expectant mother in favour of a societal interest to protect an unborn child. The majority noted "Any right or interest
153the
fetus may have remains inchoate and incomplete until the child's birth." In
dissent, Sopinka and Major JJ. contended that the born alive rule was a legal
"a common law evidentiary presumption rooted in rudimentary
anachronism
medical knowledge that has long since been overtaken by modern science." 114
The dissenters noted that the state of medical knowledge has since changed to
undermine the rule. The born alive rule is well established at common law, and
therefore it is unlikely that gametes and embryos will be considered legal
"persons." Whether they are property or something in-between however, has yet
to be determined.
In private law, such as family, child welfare, and succession law, it seems
that more emphasis is placed on the best interests of the future child, so long as
it is born alive. It is a question whether this emphasis on the best interests of the
child might also apply to the preliminary stages of human development.'55 In the
context of child welfare and family law, several issues might arise where the
interests of the fetus conflict with those of the mother's freedom to refuse medical treatment or to make certain lifestyle choices that place the fetus at risk."'
For example, the courts have held that a fetus cannot be considered a child for
purposes of apprehension by child welfare authorities."' The interests of the
fetus, and therefore, the in utero embryo, are to be determined by the mother.
...

-

148 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.

See also R. v. Sullivan (1991), 43 C.C.C. (3d) 65 (B.C.C.A).
'o Borowski v. Canada (AG.), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 342.
°' R. v. Morgentaler, [19881 1 S.C . R. 30; Winnipeg Child and Family Services v. G.(D.F.), [1997]
3 S .C .R. 925.
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Ibid.
153 Winnipeg Child and Family Services (Northwest Area) v. G.(D.F.), [1997] 3 S.C .R. 925, per
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Ibid., at 972, per Major J.
See M. Litman & G. Robertson, "Reproductive Technology: Is a Property Law Regime Appropriate?" in Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies Overview of Legal Issues in
New Reproductive Technologies, Research vol. 3 (Minister of Supply and Services Canada,

1993) at 236, 240-42.
See G.(D.F.), supra, note 151; Re "Baby R." (1988), 15 R.F.L. (3d) 225 (B.C.S.C.).
1 57
See Re A. (in utero) (1990), 72 D.L.R. (4th) 722 (Ont. U.F.C.).
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The law in relation to gametes and embryos might yet vary with the extent or
their perceived "humanness."
Under succession law, if a pregnant woman's husband provides that his estate be divided equally among all children, and he subsequently dies, the in
utero child will be deemed to have already come into existence,"' and therefore
has a right to inherit property. Similarly, intestate succession legislation supports
inheritance for those conceived at the time of the intestate's death.159 Moreover,
the common law has provided similar relief in the interests of the child conceived at the time of an accident causing the child's parent(s)' death.'6°
In the law of negligence, the child may generally claim for injuries wrongfully committed while in its mother's womb; the child need not be alive at the
time of the wrongful act.'6' Canadian tort law requires that the child be subsequently born in order for her or him (or someone on her or his behalf) to claim
negligence."' The common law confers specific rights only upon persons born
alive, and not embryos or fetuses that fail to exercise their potential for life. 161
The Supreme Court of Canada in Tremblay v. Daigle,& confirmed this position
in the context of a man's attempts to prevent a former partner from having an
abortion. The Court interpreted the Quebec Charter of Rights and Freedoms" to
mean that a fetus is not a human being; the Quebec government had not shown
"a clear intention
to consider the status of a fetus."66 Moreover, due to the
nature of embryos as forms of potential life, Canadian courts might require clear

legislative intention to regulate them. Sperm or ova alone, on the other hand,
cannot exercise any potential for life.
Gametes and embryos might be considered more like property than persons,
or vice versa, depending upon the stage of development and the context of the
owner's assertion of control."' Some commentators argue that the property approach "may well be able to accommodate competing interests in a more responsive and responsible manner than the law pertaining to persons .11161 Yet, the
property and quasi-property approaches seem inadequate in that they objectify
human reproductive "materials" and disregard important social and moral dimensions such as the sanctity of human life and the power relationships in human reproduction. Moreover, the concerns over commodification and commercialization would appear to outweigh any arguments in favour of treating gametes and embryos as a form of property and to be controlled and dominated as
objects. The use of a property approach, even in the absence of the language of
"property" and "ownership," does not provide a convincing solution, 161 but
merely hides the substantive problems discussed above. Moreover, the category
of property has been much criticized as disregarding such feminist concerns as
"the objectification of women; the economic exploitation of women; the denigration of human reproduction and the treatment of women as 'baby-making
machines'; women's alienation from their bodies; the commodification and destruction of human values."70 It would, therefore, seem odd to consider gametes
and embryos strictly as traditional property. Courts in Canada and other common law jurisdictions have so far shown no indication that gametes and embryos have full status as legal persons.'7' To do otherwise, the courts would
oppose the reproductive freedom of the parents. It remains to be seen how Canadian courts might work beyond traditional property conceptions of gametes
and embryos.
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See art. 838, CCQ (the beneficiary of the will need only be conceived at the time of the testator's death and afterwards born viable). See also the Wills Act, R.S.M. 1988, c. W-150, s. 25.3
[en. R.S.M. 1989-90, c. 44, s .5]. See also family relief legislation that also provides similar
benefits for "dependents" conceived at the time of death; See Intestate Succession Act, R.S.A.
1980, c. 1-9, s. 10. See also H. Shapo, "Matters of Life and Death: Inheritance Consequences of
Reproductive Technologies" (1997) 25 Hofstra L. Rev. 1091; K. Guzman, "Property, Progeny,
Body Part: Assisted Reproduction and the Transfer of Wealth" (1997) 31 U.C. Davis L. Rev.
193.
Ibid.
For a wide range of examples of legislation and case law, see Litman & Robertson, supra, note
155 at 237-38. For example, see Fitz.simonds v. Royal Ins. Co. of Canada (1984), 29 Alta. L.R.
(2d) 394 (C.A.) (definition of "dependant" in an automobile insurance policy). For example,
see Cherry (Guardian) v. Borsman (1990), 75 D.L.R. (4th) 668 (B.C.S.C.); affd (1992), 94
D.L.R. (4th) 487 (C.A.).
See Duval v. Seguin (1972), 26 D.L.R. (3d) 418 (Ont. H.C.); affd (1973), 40 D.L.R. (3d) 666
(CA.). In Ontario, the Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3, s. 66 supersedes this area of the
common law.
G.(D.F.), supra, note 151.
Litman & Robertson, supra, note 155 at 238. See Borowski v. Canada (AG.), supra, note 150.
A dilemma, however, might arise in the court's insistence upon hearing concrete cases with live
issues. The Supreme Court of Canada in Borowski dismissed the appeal as moot
the fetus
had not survived.
[1989] 2 S.C.R. 530.
R.S.Q. 1977, c. C-12.
Supra, note 164 at 555. The Court noted the private nature of the case and thus refused to consider the status of the fetus under the Charter. For more detailed discussion, see chapter 9
"State Intervention in the Lives of Pregnant Women." See also Litman & Robertson, supra,
note 155 at 238-40.
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2. The Personhood Approach
We have briefly touched upon the personhood approach throughout our description and critique of the traditional property approach. The personhood approach basically treats gametes and embryos as full legal persons, with all rights
and interests that other living persons might enjoy. This approach emphasizes
one's personal control over unique genetic information as essential to one's personality and liberty; human beings are considered inviolable and inalienable.
This approach differs from a property approach in two major respects: (1) it
does not support commercialization, and, (2) information is considered to be
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common to all persons, rather than a "thing" to be appropriated.172 The personhood approach however, must contend with the problem that gametes and embryos can be separated from the person(s) who generated them and be implanted
in third persons. Can these still be viewed as extensions of the person who generated them, or should these be seen as autonomous persons imbued with the
full range of the rights of persons? Under a personhdod approach, destruction of
gametes and embryos would be tantamount to murder, while their commercial
exploitation may be the equivalent of slavery.
Quebec civil law considers the control over one's body in light of "rights to
personality" and individual liberty."' In civil law, a personality rights approach
seems more accepted for personal control over one's body and its contained
information. The CCQ holds that every human being has, among others, the
right to life, personal security, inviolability, and the integrity of the person.'7
Marie Hirtle notes that the "multiple personality rights found under Quebec civil
law would confer the right to follow, to examine, and to control information
concerning and originating from a person."7' The basic presupposition is that
"the human body is dissolubly both person and thing."76 This bespeaks the inbetween approach, where gametes and embryos are treated as somewhere between property and persons, depending on the specific context. This is the sui
generis approach discussed below.

between the parties, and not the genetic material itself. ""'A sui generis approach, whether considered under the concept of property or personhood, supports a more flexible consideration of relations among persons and things. It
also emphasizes the application of policy interests on a case-by-case basis. On
the other hand, while a sui generis approach might escape the traditional constraints of a property approach, it does so only to rely upon the discretion of
courts.
This approach may be criticized as simply begging the question to what class
do gametes and embryos belong? In order to fill the legal void and arrive at a
reasoned outcome, the courts may determine that these materials or relationships
are "like" persons or property, thereby falling back on familiar statuses or relationships in an effort to arrive at a more certain legal outcome. The sui generis
approach may ultimately become self-defeating and result in a body of inconsistent analogies applied in different cases.
A possible way out of this dilemma may be offered by the relational approach, which acknowledges that these materials differ from existing categories
but recognizes the intrinsic interests which are generated by the manner in
which these materials emerge and the purposes to which they are applied. The
relational (or relationship) approach provides an alternative to that of traditional
property, personhood, and sui generis. The relational approach focuses on relationships and the conditions that foster capacity to form relationships."' Rather
than focussing on individualistic conceptions, such as rights, the relational approach acknowledges relationships among individuals and communities, for
example, those of power, responsibility, trust, obligation, respect, and caretaking."' In doing so, the law might sensitively adapt to changing societal values
and advances in RTs, and perhaps better address issues of "control, decisionmaking authority, and responsibility" for potential human life.
Although the relational approach provides a critical alternative to the traditional property and personhood approaches, choices and decisions must yet be
made about the status and disposition of gametes and embryos, and the relationships among the women and men who contribute genetically or non-genetically
to human reproduction. The choices and decisions resulting from the resolution
of legal disputes in practice, will create hierarchies of relationships deemed
worthy of legal recognition and status. A relational approach, however, may
appear useful in allowing courts to better recognize relationships of power and
control over the lives of genetic contributors and gestational providers, especially those women who bear additional responsibilities,"' as well as in recognizing gametes and embryos as potential human life. As the Royal Commission
states, it is "essential to ensure that zygotes (and presumably, gametes) are

338

...

3. Sui Generis and Other Approaches
Rather than treat gametes and embryos as one of the two extremes
as objects
(property) or as subjects (persons)
the courts may consider some type of sui
generis or relational approach on a case-by-case basis."' It has been said that
"the emerging trend is to characterize the legal status of the embryos ex utero
and gametes as sui generis.""' Sui generis means "its own type" or "class by
itself." In other words, such an approach denies any analogy between this class
of objects and any other type of relationship or entity. In using this approach,
the focus remains on the factual setting and "particularly, on the relationship
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treated with respect because of their connections to the human community."83
Having discussed various conceptual frameworks for the status and control of
gametes and embryos, we now analyze specific legal issues related to the control and use of gametes and embryos.
[IIDxIvtS]

111f111)
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1. Gamete and Embryo Donation
A woman may wish to reproduce using the sperm or ova of known or anonymous donors in a number of circumstances including: the absence of a male
partner, the existence of male factor infertility in her partner, or the desire to
avoid the transferring of infectious diseases or genetic conditions to offspring.
Ovum and embryo donation can be used in cases of female factor infertility, or
for example, where two women choose to share the genetic and gestational aspects of pregnancy. In some cases sperm and ovum may be treated or otherwise
manipulated to facilitate fertilization. We now consider the regulation of gamete
and embryo donation in Canada, highlighting differences encountered in their
regulation. The analysis will illustrate a range of solutions depending upon the
choice of conceptual framework to be applied to gametes and embryos: whether
they are treated as property, persons, or something in between (sui generis).
(a) Gametes
In Canada and elsewhere, the special nature of human tissues, and specifically,
gametes (sperm and ova), has resulted in attempts to regulate their transfer. In
Canada, the federal government now regulates the processing and distribution of
semen for assisted conception.'tm This legislation uses the language of "donor" to
address the distribution of sperm and ova. The province of Quebec regulates the
donation of both sperm and ova, and deems the gestational mother to be the
legal mother for legal purposes.185 As well, in most provinces, legislation exists
to control the transfer of human tissues for organ transplantation. "'As we have
discussed previously, one might argue that human tissue legislation includes the
donation of gametes and embryos. These particular human tissues however, are
unique in their potential to create life and are not "replaceable by natural processes of repair." In varying degrees, sperm, ova and embryos deserve special
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Royal Commission, Proceed With Care: Final Report of the Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1992) at 17.
Processing and Distribution of Semen for Assisted Conception Regulations, SOR/96-254 under
the Food and Drugs Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-27.
CCQ 1991, c. 64, art. 19, 538-42.
For example, see Human Tissue Gift Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H. 20, s. 1; Human Tissue Gift Act,
R.S.A. 1980, c. H-12, s. 1(b); Human Tissue Gift Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 211, s. 1. But see also
CCQ 1991, c. 64, art. 19, which States that a person may
alienate a part of his [sic] body
only if that part is capable of regeneration and provided that no serious risk to his [sic] health
results." Article 20 of the CCQ requires that "[t]he alienation must be gratuitous unless its object is a part of the body susceptible to regeneration."
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consideration as human tissue necessary for reproduction. Although human tissue legislation might or might not apply to gametes and embryos, Canadian
courts may find it useful to draw parallels to the statutory provisions of such
legislation.
The transfer of human tissue is generally considered as a gift, not a sale. Section 10 of the Ontario Human Tissue Gift Act"' states, "[n]o person shall buy,
sell or otherwise deal in, directly or indirectly, for a valuable consideration, any
tissue for a transplant, or any body or part or parts thereof other than blood or a
blood constituent, for therapeutic purposes, medical education or scientific research, and any such dealing is invalid as being contrary to public policy.""'
Similarly, art. 25 of the CCQ states, "[t]he alienation by a person of a part or
product of his body shall be gratuitous; it may not be repeated if it involves a
risk to his health."
Several provincial statutes regulate who may donate human tissues generally,
and gametes specifically. Article 538 of the CCQ provides that a person may
donate gametes for "[p]articipation in the parental project of another person by
way of a contribution of genetic material." Section 3(1) of the Ontario Human
Tissue Gift Act states that a person may consent to an inter vivos gift for transplant, if she or he is at least 16 years old, mentally competent, and able to make
a free and informed decision. Section 4(1) of the Human Tissue Gift Act provides that a person, if she or he is at least 16 years old, may consent to a post
mortem gift, "in writing signed by the person at any time; or orally in the presence of a least two witnesses during the person's last illness." The gift can be
made "for therapeutic purposes, medical education or scientific research."
The common law also tends to distinguish between the various forms of a
gift inter vivos and a gift causa mortis. Gamete donation may occur during the
donor's lifetime, or after her or his death. These two scenarios have traditionally
created different responses under the law of property. The transfer of reproductive "materials" and the use of RTs, however, require a more complex approach
to legal analysis than traditionally applied under the law of property.
Gametes from a donor who has since died may be used for reproduction. Persons can now store their gametes in sperm or ova banks, for subsequent donation after death. It seems that courts will recognize the special nature of gametes, and requirements and conditions for the exchange of human tissue, especially in the case where contributors have since died."' As a matter of public
policy, however, some argue the gametes of deceased donors should not be used
for reproduction because of the possible effects on children born without live
genetic parents. Ethical issues also arise when gametes are retrieved from donors who are deceased persons or fetuses. For example, a woman might wish to
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use sperm from a dead male partner,"' or a man might wish to use ova from a
dead female partner to be fertilized by in vitro fertilization and implanted in a
gestational mother)9'
Under Ontario's Human Tissue Gift Act,"' where the deceased person has not
given consent and dies, or cannot give consent by reason of injury or disease,
and the person's death is imminent, s. 5(2) provides a lengthy hierarchal list of
persons, beginning with spouses, children and relatives, who may, on behalf of
that person, consent to transplantation. Section 5(2)(/) provides that where no
spouse or relatives can be found, transplantation may be authorized by the "the
person lawfully in possession of the body other than, where the person died in
hospital, the administrative head of the hospital." Under s. 5(3), consent cannot
be given if there is reason to believe that the deceased person would have objected. If ova and sperm fall under the Human Tissue Gift Act, post mortem reproduction may be considered legal in Ontario. However, this might be considered morally unacceptable where retrieval of sperm and ova requires an invasive
procedure on a "brain dead" person, in contrast to retrieval from existing supplies in storage banks. Further issues arise as to whether or not the deceased
should be considered the legal father or mother for purposes of birth registration
or inheritance. In these cases, and in the absence of specific legislation, Canadian courts may draw analogies to organ transplantation under the Human Tissue Gift Act and the law of adoption.
For post mortem reproduction, the main issue is whether the deceased intended to have children after death. Although Canadian courts have not addressed this, courts in other jurisdictions have. In Parpalaix v. CECOS,' 93 the
French Tribunaux de grande instance discussed the dispositional control over
the donor's sperm deposit, and the issue of whether the donor intended to have
children during his lifetime or after death. The Tribunaux held in favour of the
deceased donor's wishes to have children after death. In Hecht v. Superior Court
of the State of California for the County of Los Angeles (Kane),' 94 the California
Court of Appeal recognized the deceased donor's expressed intentions. In
Hecht, the court held that the donor had an ownership interest under at least an
"interim category," if not personal property law. In the case of R. v. Human
Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, ex parte Blood,"' the English Court of
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R. v. Human Fertilization and Embryology Authority ex parte Blood, [1996] 3 W.L.R. 1177
(Q.B.D.); R. v. Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, ex parte Blood, [1997] 2 All
E.R. 687 (CA.).
These scenarios are not so unusual given medical advances in physically maintaining "legally
dead" (or "brain dead") persons.
Supra, note 185.
T.G.I. Creteil, August 1, 1984, Gazette do Palais, September 15, 1984 (France), as discussed in
E.D. Shapiro & B. Sonnenblick, "The Widow and the Sperm: The Law of Post-mortem Insemination," 1 J.L. & Health 229 (1986/87), as cited in Hecht v. Superior Court, 20 CaLRptr. 2d
275, 288 (Ct. App. 1993). See also D.J. Jones, "Artifical Procreation, Societal Reconceptions:
Legal Insight From France" (1988) 36 Am. J. Comp. L. 525.
Hecht v. Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Los Angeles (Kane), 20
Cal.Rptr. 2d 275 (1993).
R. v. Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, ex parte Blood, supra, note 190.
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Appeal considered a woman's attempts to use the sperm she obtained from her
comatose husband. The husband died shortly afterwards. The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990,196 clearly required expressed written consent of
a donor for the taking and use of his sperm, including for posthumous reproduction. No written consent existed in this case.'97
The commercialization of human reproduction raises obvious concerns, despite the law's insistence that the transfer of gametes be treated as gifts only.
Although Bill C-47 does not explicitly address the issue, it does provide some
indirect constraints subject to interpretation. Section 6(1) would prohibit the
sale, purchase, barter or exchange of sperm, ova, or embryos, or an offer to do
so. Section 6(2), however, provides an exception to s. 6(1) for "the reimbursement of expenses incurred in the collection, storage or distribution of ova or
sperm, except any such expenses incurred by their donor." Although compensation for gamete donation is usually limited to reasonable expenses, the definition
of "expenses" is a matter for interpretation.
Moreover, there has been much concern over the exploitation of women who
exchange "spare" eggs (or ova) to be implanted in other women in return for
compensation or reduced fees for in vitro fertilization or other medical services."' In some medical practices, women patients are asked for the "designated
donation" of ova in exchange for services or reduced rates. The Royal Commission would prohibit physicians from revoking services when a woman chooses
not to donate spare ova. Moreover, a free market approach towards human reproduction has been criticized for devaluing and degrading gametes. It treats
gametes as property and their producers as reproductive means. To address such
concerns, the regulation of sperm and ova donation should maintain some
flexibility for changing social norms.
Rather than suggesting an absolute ban on such exchanges, several commentators emphasized the importance of women's informed consent to embryo donation in these circumstances. It is suggested that informed consent might ameliorate the power imbalances and exploitation that women may face due to socio-economic disparities. Others contend that truly informed consent is not possible in light of an already existing state of gender inequities. We have previously discussed the issue of informed consent. However, it is noteworthy to
mention that Canadian courts have not yet faced the issue of revocation of consent by a gamete donor. One might argue that the option to revoke consent prior
to actual implantation of gametes into recipients would empower women by
making available choices in some circumstances.
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Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, 1990, ch. 37(5) (Eng.).
Ms. Blood did however, succeed in receiving the tight to use her husband's sperm for artificial
insemination. Pursuant Ao another section of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act,
1990, the sperm could be exported abroad and Ms. Blood inseminated in a European Community state (ibid.).
P. Cheney, "Human egg trade lures elite students," The Globe and Mail (9 July 1998) Al.
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(b) Embryos
Embryo donation raises different issues than those for gametes per se. Given
their potential for human life, embryos, like fetuses, deserve special attention
under existing law or a future regulatory regime. In addition, embryos involve
two genetic contributors, each with a potential interest in the embryo. The
common law may distinguish between in utero and ex utero embryos. The latter
are located in a storage bank while the former are located in the womb of a gestational mother. Canadian courts, especially in the context of abortion, have
acknowledged that women have full autonomy to make decisions over their
bodies and to abort embryos or fetuses they may be carrying.'99
The legal issues of control and parenthood, however, become more complicated in the context of RTs where the gestational mother differs from the genetic
mother. The courts have yet to face the difficult issue of revocation of consent
for the donation
fh[ to it gestational mother Cana
dfaifö&irts, however, would
mothern the control
and disposition of an embryo that has already been implanted.
Embryo donation requires the informed consent of both genetic donors, if
known. Consent should be clearly expressed, specific, and in writing. For embryo donation particularly, an agreement might cover disposition for such contingencies as the death of one or both donors. As well, an agreement could expressly address dispositional issues upon the revocation of consent by one or
both donors. However, it is uncertain whether Canadian courts would enforce
such an agreement given the special, unique nature of embryo donation. The
issues also raise the arguments familiar in the debate over abortion: the pro-life
versus pro-choice schools of thought. The courts, however, will likely emphasize the special nature of embryos as potential life forms and the autonomy of
gestational mothers in making decisions that directly affect their lives.
A woman who separates from a male partner" may seek custody of cryopreserved embryos in which she and her partner genetically contributed. The
woman may wish to keep the embryos for herself for subsequent implantation.
Or, she may wish to transfer the embryos (or dispositional authority) to a third
party, for example, another woman or couple, or to simply destroy the embryos.
If the male contributor is opposed to such a transfer or destruction, and if Canadian courts support joint control, then the woman would have no legal recourse.
The common law abroad has thus far supported joint control over embryo disposition where neither contributor is an anonymous donor. In the case of cryopreserved (or frozen) embryos, if the parties cannot mutually agree, then by
court order or pre-conception contract, the embryo bank (where the embryos are
stored in cryopreservation) may allow the embryo to perish.20' In Davis v.
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Davis,200 as we previously discussed, the court directly confronted the issue of

whether one genetic contributor, Ms. Davis, could transfer the cryopreserved
pre-embryos to another woman, despite Mr. Davis' wishes not to proceed. In the
end, the court in Davis recognized that each contributor has an equal say in the
disposition of the frozen ex utero pre-embryos. Mr. Davis' right not to reproduce trumped Ms. Davis' right to transfer the embryos to another woman. The
emphasis on joint control, however, does not seem to adequately address gender-based imbalances in power and control over human reproduction. In making
decisions over control and disposition, the courts should consider the fact that
women undergo an invasive procedure to remove some of their limited supply
of ova for donation. In such cases, the courts should proceed cautiously and
with careful review of power imbalances and policy interests, in the absence of
clear legislation.
A different scenario arises where both the woman and man initially abandoned the cryopreserved embryos but later found that the embryo bank sought
to donate them for implantation into other women. This situation, given the embryo's development and potential for human life, may warrant a higher standard
of consent by both genetic contributors for the specific purposes of the embryo
implantation, as well as a specific threshold for abandonment.
Genetic parents, like those in Davis, can vary or revoke their consent for embryo donation. One or both genetic contributors might revoke consent for embryo donation, despite prior agreement to the contrary. In the case of one
anonymous contributor, embryo donation may follow the same rules and principles applicable to gamete donation. Moreover, the intended gestational mother
might revoke her consent to be the recipient. The disposition of embryos could
become problematic when one or both of the genetic contributors die. The
Royal Commission recommends that embryos not be stored beyond the death of
one or both of the genetic contributors.203 Again, it remains to be seen how Canadian courts might decide these latter issues. As we discussed previously, s. 5
of the Human Tissue Gift Act provides for the post mortem transfer of dispositional authority to non-family members, provided that there is no reason "to
believe that the deceased person would have objected."200
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v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30.
The novelty of reproductive technologies have not yet provided much opportunity for the law
to consider same sex couples. See Korn v. Potter (1996), 134 D.L.R. (4th) 437 (B.C.S.C.).
See A. Eser, "The Legal Status of the Embryo in Comparative Perspective" (1992) 11 Medicine
and Law 579.
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842 S.W. 2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).
Royal Commission, supra, note 183 at 599.
The first publicized case to raise issues about the status and disposition of frozen embryos
created through in vitro fertilization involved Mr. and Mrs. Rios, a wealthy California couple
who received in vitro fertilization in Australia. Two embryos were frozen when Mr. and Mrs.
Rios died in an airplane crash. Apparently the Rioses left no written instructions regarding the
fate of the "orphan embryos" and a lengthy and heated debate arose about whether the embryos
should be destroyed, made available for anonymous donation, or deliberately gestated in order
to permit them to inherit an intestate share of the Rioses' estate. For further discussion of this
case and the issues it raises see: George P. Smith II., "Australia's Frozen 'Orphan' Embryos: A
Medical, Legal and Ethical Dilemma" (1985-86) 24 J. F. L. 27.
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The use of donor gametes raises issues of identification and anonymity. Some
women may choose to bear a child using the sperm or ova of anonymous donors. An infertile couple may wish to combine anonymous donations of sperm
and ova, with hopes of implanting the embryo into the woman partner as gestational mother. The availability of sperm and ova will depend upon the supply of
and access to anonymous donor contributions, usually through sperm and ova
banks. Embryos however, are rarely made available for donation.
The requirement of informed consent also applies to anonymous donors. The
donor must be informed of the specific purpose of the donation and the potential
benefits and risks. Anonymous donors, if they provide informed consent, generally waive their beneficial interests and right to control gametes and embryos,
as well as future child support obligations and custody rights. Thus, donors receive anonymity in exchange for their own relinquishment of dispositional control and the guarantee that no legal claims will be found against them. Canadian
courts, moreover, tend not to hold anonymous donors liable for the quality and
fitness of the product.205 This position supports the policy interest of making
available a large pool of sperm and ova for donation.
A more controversial issue arises if the donor wishes to remain anonymous,
whereas the child seeks access to information that identifies her or his genetic
parents. At some point the child's interest in obtaining social, cultural and medical information for her or his psychological or social well-being could override
the policy interest to ensure a large supply of donor sperms and eggs. One possible resolution would centre on the child's access to non-identifying genetic
information. This would, however, still lead to issues about the nature and extent of such information and its restricted availability. In serious medical cases
where the child's health or life is at risk, key genetic information should be
made available.
A registry is one possible solution to ensure limits to the number of offspring
by donors and to guarantee that children genetically-related do not unknowingly
reproduce. It might also be helpful for children to receive counselling prior to
receiving registry information about their genetic parents. The existence of a
donation registry, however, may lead to misuses or abuses of information by
governments and private parties. In order to resolve these issues, Canadian
courts will likely draw parallels to the statutory and common law respecting
adoption.
Genetic and gestational parents, if they differ, may also have a legal obligation to tell their children about non-genetic links to donors. There seems to
be a strong societal interest in children knowing the "genetic truth." If such
obligations exist, and in the absence of relevant legislation, the courts will
likely consider an appropriate age for the disclosure of the fact of donation
and for the provision of specific information about the donor. In the absence

205 ter Neuzen V.
Korn, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 674.

Regulating Reproductive Technologies in Canada

347

of such disclosure, children might suffer from "genetic bewilderment" and
social stigmatization .21
Children may also attempt to claim support payments or inheritance from an
identified donor. The issue remains whether common law courts will refuse to
provide children with legal interests against donors or their estates. In deciding
such legal issues, Canadian courts would likely consider the "best interests of
the child" principle, and the policy interest in the availability of anonymous
donation. Where the child wishes however, the donor might revoke his or her
anonymity arrangement.
3. Freezing and Disposal of Gametes and Embryos
The freezing (or cryopreservation) of tissues provides new opportunities for the
testing and screening of ex utero sperm, ova, and embryos for donation.
Donated sperm, ova, and embryos may now be screened for HIV, other sexually
transmitted diseases, and various genetic factors. Moreover, a physician's duty
of care as a medical professional now requires reasonable efforts to test and
screen donation, whether known or anonymous.207 This duty has now been
specifically detailed and embodied in a federal statute dealing with the processing and distribution of semen,208
potential forms of human
In light of the sensitivity of the subject matter
governments
may impose limits on
life and uniquely identifying information
the condition and quantity of gametes and embryos stored and transferred between individuals and institutions. In Canada, for example, the federal government now regulates the processing and distribution of semen for assisted conception.209 Moreover, at common law, storage facilities might have a duty of
care to screen and test frozen gametes and embryos for illnesses and genetic
conditions."' One might argue, however, that governmental regulation of the
storage and handling facilities for gametes and embryos may lead to increased
use of unlicensed artificial insemination and higher risks due to the absence of
donor screening for illnesses and genetic disease.211 In other words, a regulatory
regime that too strictly controls the storage and transfer of gametes and embryos
could lead to an underground market for reproductive services and "materials."
The few common law cases so far decided, indicate the importance of the
donor parties' intentions prior to the freezing and storage of gametes and embryos.212 The parties should also express their intentions with respect to such
-

-

206 R. Achilles, "The Social Meanings of Donor Insemination" The Royal Commission on New
Reproductive Technologies, vol. 9 (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1993).
207 See ter Neuzen v. Korn, supra, note 205.
205 Processing and Distribution of Semen for Assisted Conception Regulations, S0R196-254, under
the Food and Drugs Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-27.
209 Ibid.
210 See ter Neuzen v. Korn, supra, note 205.
211 However, see the regulations of the Food and Drugs Act, supra, note 208, which became enforceable June 1, 1996 (the federal government controls the processing, testing and distribution
of semen for donor insemination).
212 Davis v. Davis, supra, note 202.
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dispositional contingencies as the donors' death or abandonment of donation. As
previously discussed, human tissue gift legislation might apply to gametes and
embryos once frozen and stored, assuming they fall under the Act. If so, ss
5(2)(f) and (3) of Ontario's Human Tissue Gift Act213 suggest that storage banks
might have a dispositional authority (over "transplantation") based on possession, if no other family member or relative can be found, and there is no reason
to believe that the deceased person would have objected.
The abandonment of sperm, ova or embryo donations creates new issues of
control and disposition. Storage facilities may assert control over abandoned
gametes and embryos on the sole basis of possession. Also, those parties who
assisted in the abstraction of such reproductive materials and products might
attempt to gain dispositional control over them. The situation may also be similar where the donors of gametes and embryos die, without any expressed intentions and specific instructions for donation. The freezing of sperm and ova can
therefore lead to complex issues of dispositional authority. Moreover, the disposal of gametes and embryos should occur by means which account for their
status as potential (or early) forms of human life.
The commercialization of freezing processes and storage facilities for gametes and embryos raises serious concerns. The Final Report of the Royal Commission recommended:
No profit should be made from the selling of any reproductive material, including
sperm, because of ultimately dc-humanizing effects. Current commercial practices
in storage and distribution of donor sperm contravene these values, and we recommend a licensed, non profit system .214
The Royal Commission warns against the commercialization of human reproduction and the commodification of gametes and embryos. Moreover, Bill C-47
would call for the licensing of such facilities and allow for the "reimbursement
of expenses incurred in the collection, storage or distribution of ova or sperm,
except any such expenses incurred by their donor. 1121' The maximum storage
period for frozen embryos has been variously debated. The Royal Commission
suggested that it would be unethical to store beyond five years or after the death
of either partner .211 One might also argue that time limits be applied to the storage of sperm and ova. Moreover, the personnel for such storage banks should be
qualified in the handling, processing and distributing of such sensitive
"materials." The personnel also might be subject to government regulation. To
ensure that qualified personnel are employed and that facilities are properly
maintained and managed may require government licensing and regulation.
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Ovarian stimulation and ovum retrieval usually lead to the generation of a number of embryos, one or some of which are selected and implanted into a woman.
It has been generally recognized that the treatment of "spare" embryos is an
important matter of human dignity and integrity."' As previously discussed,
embryos, as potential human life, have moral status somewhere in between
property and full personhood, and should be treated with respect. In light of the
moral status of embryos and the potential risks to society, research on them may
be totally prohibited, or at least, carefully regulated and monitored. Some have
argued that ova should not be fertilized for the sole purposes of embryo research, except in unusual circumstances as determined by a regulatory body
where knowledge cannot be attained by other means, and where such research
would benefit society as well as future children."' Others have argued that the
fertilization of ova for research should be widely permitted in that it could advance scientific knowledge and benefit society.219
The commercialization of embryo research has also been generally recognized as immoral. The selling and buying of sperm, ova, and embryos has
been widely condemned in Canada and abroad. Proposed federal legislation,
Bill C-47, would impose criminal sanctions for the sale, purchase, barter or
exchange of gametes and embryos, whether for research or other purposes.22° It
is acknowledged, however, that some expenses or compensation for losses incurred would be necessary to ensure minimum supplies for embryo research, if
allowed. Article 25 of the CCQ states that "[aln experiment may not give rise to
any financial reward other than the payment of an indemnity as compensation
for the loss and inconvenience suffered." Some commentators support the allowance of "out-of-pocket" expenses and non-profit costs for storage, handling,
transportation and transfer .221
Bill C-47, by contrast, would allow for the "reimbursement of expenses incurred in the collection, storage or distribution of ova or sperm, except any such
expenses incurred by their donor .11211 Existing and proposed statutory law for
gamete and embryo donation, however, rather vaguely define such terms as expenses, compensation, or losses.
A primary issue of public concern is the age limit of embryos subject to research, in light of the initial development of nervous systems and possible human suffering. It has been recommended that any research be limited to em-
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See I. Kennedy, "The Moral Status of the Embryo," in I. Kennedy, Treat Me Right: Essays in
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bryos not older than 14 days from conception
which is also the stage at
which implantation no longer becomes medically viable .221
As discussed previously in section IV.A "Informed Consent" of this chapter,
donors must provide informed consent specific to the purposes of research on
gametes and embryos. Consent for embryo donation for research purposes
should be clearly expressed and in written form .114 Informed consent may require that donors be aware of specific research uses, as well as a range of options, including gestational use, donation to other women, or disposal .221 It has
been recommended that "a very high level of disclosure" be required, includin g
success rates and the range of possible negative outcomes where known .221
Various concerns have also been raised over women and men being unaware
subjects of experimentation. In cases of re-implantation of an embryo in a
woman's body, informed consent requires her awareness of the "experimental,
innovative or unproven" nature of techniques, such as pre-implantation genetic
diagnosis .121 Medical scientists, on the other hand, often argue that such strict
standards for consent "chill" research that could otherwise benefit society. It
seems that Canadian society, through dialogue and debate, may consider the
effects on embryo research specifically, and biotechnology generally, in light of
their social implications.
Some provincial statutes expressly regulate the use of such materials for research. For example, art. 22 of the CCQ stipulates that "a part of the body,
whether an organ, tissue or other substance, removed from a person as part of
the care he receives may, with his consent or that of the person qualified to give
consent for him, be used for purposes of research." Under s. 4(1) of the Ontario
Human Tissue Gift Act,227a a person may consent to have her or his body or body
parts removed and used for "medical education or scientific research." According to ss. 5(2) and (3), where the deceased person has not given consent and
dies, or cannot give consent by reason of injury or disease, and the person's
death is imminent, the Human Tissue Gift Act allocates dispositional authority
according to a hierarchal list of family members, relatives, or other authorities in
possession of the body. There must, however, exist no reason to believe that the
deceased person would have objected. In the case of embryos, proposed s. 7(3)
of Bill C-47 would require consent by the "producers" of embryos for the specific purpose of research.
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Reproductive technologies raise a myriad of legal, ethical and social issues with
which society must contend. These include questions about who should have
access to their use, how to control the disposition of excess embryos and
whether women should be inseminated with the sperm of men who are now
deceased. Finding answers to these issues is difficult, in part, because there is no
social consensus concerning which acts and practices should be permissible. As
we have suggested in this chapter, while some of the legal questions generated
by reproductive technologies might be adequately resolved by applying existing
common law principles and statutes to them, there is a widely held sentiment,
that a direct legislative response is needed. Legislative intervention would ensure respect for the fundamental values of Canadian society, protect the public
against risks to health and safety, and provide clear principles of law according
to which potential disputes could be resolved.
The design of a legislative response to reproductive technologies in Canada
remains a difficult enterprise. We need to assess the effectiveness of different
types of law to answer problems raised by RTs. For example, the use of criminal
prohibitions rather than more flexible regulatory regimes need to be considered.
In addition, there may be a danger in assuming that new laws enacted by Parliament or legislatures can adequately address all of the problems raised by RTs.
It has been argued that the challenge posed by RTs "is to harness the law so as
to mediate between moral imperatives and the therapeutic or non-therapeutic
benefits of the advancement of science.""' How can we fashion a regulatory
regime "which incorporates a review of the ethical and social consequences of
the technology""' in addition to ensuring its safety and efficacy? The fact of
Canadian federalism further complicates the possibility of a national and uniform approach to the regulation of reproductive technologies. On the other
hand, in the absence of a legislated regulatory framework, the development of
case law may be more susceptible to differing interpretations and policy preferences in the different jurisdictions under Canadian federalism. Here, the traditional role of the federal government in regulating medical technology overlaps
with the exclusive provincial role in the provision of medical services.
The commodification of gametes and embryos and the commercialization of
human reproduction raise pressing concerns that cannot be left to market forces
and an order of private law. Any regulatory regime must flexibly account for the
social and biological dimensions of reproductive technologies, in light of the
Canadian Constitution and evolving societal norms. At the same time, medical
research and technological developments ought not be overly constrained or
"chilled" because of regulation. Canadians will likely be affected by develop-
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ments outside Canada's borders. Conflicting and inconsistent precedents both
from Canadian and other common law jurisdictions are likely to leave a de facto
situation of market regulation with private ordering as the default. Moreover,
given the central role played by medical practitioners in offering and providing
reproductive technologies, any form of piecemeal private ordering is likely to
leave in place the medical model as the dominant model of decision-making.
Once private ordering and market forces become entrenched it may be very difficult to put in place an alternative statutory regime and a distinctive form of
administrative regulation.
The Royal Commission and other commissions and panels have raised concerns over reproductive technologies before the public. If reproductive technologies are a response to infertility, it should be recognized that infertility is as
much a social condition as a medical problem. Bill C-47, which died on the order paper, provides an initial basis from which legislators might attempt to coordinate a comprehensive regulatory regime that respects the profound social
consequences of reproductive technologies. Any such regime should carefully
account for the responsible gatekeeping of new forms of family and the effects
on personal and social lives. It remains to be seen whether a distinctive Canadian regulatory regime will be fashioned in this area.
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The Human Genome Project is a massive scientific endeavor designed to sequence and eventually map the human genetic code. Once this mapping of the
"genetic landscape" is complete, scientists will then concentrate on identifying
the actual biological function of each gene. This will facilitate a revolution in
medical diagnostics, screening, and therapies for genetic disorders.'
While the possible benefits of the project are immense, the sensitive nature of
the data has potential for significant harms (whether unintentional or intentional). Indeed, concern for the proper use of genetic information has raised
several key policy dilemmas. For example: what are the implications for autonomy and privacy?; what is the legal status of human genetic material i.e., is it
property or person?; what are the social and legal implications of DNA forensic
identification testing in criminal and family law cases?; is there a risk that insurance companies will inappropriately use genetic information for risk assessment?; and does genetic information have the potential to be used to justify discriminatory practices in employment settings?
This chapter seeks to review these and other issues. Through the review it
will illustrate not only the different areas of law affected by the new human genetics but also the need for an over-arching ethical framework to address such
problems.

II. BACKGROUND
A. GENETICS
Proteins are the building blocks of the human body. They are present in many
forms throughout the human body and they can be found as enzymes, haemo-
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